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Abstract
We propose a modiﬁcation to the framework of Universally Composable (UC) security [3]. Our new
notion, involves comparing the protocol executions with an ideal execution involving ideal functionalities
(just as in UC-security), but allowing the environment and adversary access to some super-polynomial
computational power. We argue the meaningfulness of the new notion, which in particular subsumes
many of the traditional notions of security.
We generalize the Universal Composition theorem of [3] to the new setting. Then under new com-
putational assumptions, we realize secure multi-party computation (for static adversaries) without a
common reference string or any other set-up assumptions, in the new framework. This is known to be
impossible under the UC framework.
1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, there has been tremendous success in placing cryptography on a sound theoretical
foundation, and building an amazingly successful theory out of it. The key elements in this Modern Cryp-
tographic Theory are the deﬁnitions capturing the intuitive, yet elusive notions of security in the various
cryptographic settings. The deﬁnitions of early 80’s proved to be extremely successful in this regard. But
with time, as the theory started addressing more and more complex concerns, further notions of security
had to be introduced. One of the most important concerns theory ventured into is of complex environments
where the different parties are communicating with each other concurrently in many different protocols. The
original deﬁnitions turned out to be inadequate to handle this. A series of efforts in extending the original
deﬁnitions culminated in the paradigm of Universally Composable (UC) Security [3], which along with
modeling a general complex network of parties and providing deﬁnitions of security in that model, provided
powerful tools for building protocols satisfying such deﬁnitions.
The Background: Universally Composable Security The basic underlying notion of security in the
UC model and its predecessors is based on simulation. An “ideal” world is described, where all requisite
tasks get accomplished securely, as if by magic. The goal of the protocol designer is to ﬁnd a way to
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1accomplish these tasks in the “real” world (where magic is hard to come by) so that no malicious adversary
can take advantage of this substitution of ideal magic by real protocols. To formalize this, we say that for
every malicious adversary A that tries to take advantage of the real world, there is an adversary S that can
achieve essentially the same results in the ideal world. The “results” are reﬂected in the behaviour of an
environment. In this paper we shall refer to this notion of security as “Environmental Security.” If a real-life
protocol “Environmentally Securely realizes” a task, it ensures us that replacing the magic by reality does
not open up new unforeseen threats to the system. (There may already be threats to the system even in
the ideal world. But employing cryptographic primitives cannot offer a solution if the ideal system itself is
badly conceived.) The ideal world adversary S is called a simulator as it simulates the real world behavior
of A, in the ideal world.
The advantage of Environmentally Secure (ES) protocols, as shown in [3], is that they are “Universally
Composable,” i.e., roughly, if multiple copies of an ES-protocol are present in the system (in fact they
could be copies of different protocols), then they collectively ES-realize the collection of the tasks they
individually ES-realize. (Hence we shall often refer to the model in [3] as the ES/UC model, or simply
ES-model or UC-model.) The importance of composability is that it makes it possible to easily reason about
a system running multiple ES protocols. In particular, a protocol employing multiple ES sub-protocols can
be analyzed effectively. Without this, we do not have any tool to construct secure protocols for complex
tasks like Multi-party computation.
Unfortunately, the notion of Environmental Security as introduced in [3] turns out to be too strong
to be achievable in standard settings. It has been shown that much of the interesting cryptographic tasks
(including e.g. commitment, zero knowledge and secure multi-party computation) cannot be ES-realized
when the adversary can control at least half the parties [3, 4, 6]. On the other hand, under a trusted setup
assumption (of questionable applicability in many situations) – that there is public reference string chosen
by a completely trusted party – it is known how to build protocols for the most ambitious of cryptographic
tasks (general secure multiparty computation with dishonest majority) satisfying the Environmental Security
deﬁnition. Also it is known how to achieve this when the majority of the parties are honest. In this work
we seek to develop such protocols in the plain model (without trusted setup), by modifying the notion of
security, while still retaining composability.
This Work: New Ideas This work seeks to modify the ES/UC model, so as to achieve strongly secure
and composable protocols for important cryptographic tasks, in the plain-model, i.e., without the common-
reference string. Our starting point is the observation that in the ideal world used by the ES/UC model,
even if the adversary has unlimited computational powers, the ideal world captures the notion of security
in most cases of interest. Accordingly, we generalize the ES/UC model, by providing the ideal adversary
with super-polynomial computational resources. However, if composability needs to be retained, we should
provide the environment also with similar computational powers, which will lead us back to the strong
impossibility results of [3, 4, 6]. Thus, on the face of it, we still cannot have an attainable (in plain model)
environmental security notion, unless composability is abandoned (which is undesirable, because then it
is not clear how to build and prove security of protocols for complex tasks). But by introducing a novel
thought-experiment into the ideal world we manage to take advantage of the new model, so that we obtain
universally composable secure multiparty computation protocol for any multiparty functionality.
Weintroducethenewnotionsofenvironmentalsecurityintwosteps, startingfromthenotionin[3]. First
is a weakening, to get a notion called relaxed Environmental Security (rES), followed by a strengthening
to get a framework of security called generalized Environmental Security (gES).
Relaxed Environmental Security: Consider the ideal world version of a commitment protocol between two
2parties. There is a trusted third party (ideal functionality) which has secure channels with the two parties.
In the commitment phase, the functionality receives a bit from the sender, and informs the receiver that it
received a bit (without telling it which bit, or anything else). Later, in the reveal phase the sender can request
the functionality to reveal the bit, and it will send the bit it originally received to the receiver. The receiver
will accept only a bit coming from the same copy of the functionality which accepted the commitment in
the ﬁrst place.
Now we observe that the computational power of an adversary is irrelevant in this ideal world. This is
because the security in the ideal world is information-theoretic. Indeed, in most applications, the function-
ality is so deﬁned as to capture the notion of security with no reference to the power of the adversary. It is
legitimate for a computationally unbounded adversary to interact with the honest parties in the ideal world.
This motivates the deﬁnition of relaxed ES, which is identical to that of ES, except that now the ideal
world adversary is allowed to be unbounded, or say super-polynomial (depending on how much we want to
relax the notion). We argue that this is a satisfactory notion of (environmental) security for most tasks of
interest.
Realizability versus Composability: Allowing the simulator to be more powerful than the real world adver-
sary would help us overcome the impossibility results from [3, 4, 6]. Similar motivation is behind previous
works which explored super-polynomial or quasi-polynomial simulation (e.g. [20]) in the context of simpler
compositions. However, as mentioned above, to prove the Universal Composition theorem we do require
that the environment considered be as powerful as the ideal world adversaries. Unfortunately, if we provide
both the ideal adversary and the environment with the same computational power, no matter how large, the
impossibility results continue to hold (see later for an explanation).
We get out of this apparent deadlock using novel techniques. We introduce ways to strengthen the
relaxed Environmental Security notion resulting in new notions of security, collectively called generalized
Environmental Security. It is under one such notion that we give universally composable protocols for any
efﬁciently implementable functionality.
Generalized Environmental Security: Generalized Environmental Security (gES) is a class of security deﬁ-
nitions, which includes the original ES notion from [3]. All these deﬁnitions imply relaxed Environmental
Security. Further we shall see that some of them are realizable without any trusted setup and imply universal
composability. The central notion in deﬁning gES is that of “Imaginary Angels.” An Imaginary Angel is
essentially a super-polynomial time oracle imagined to be available to the environment and adversary in
the real or ideal world. (We use the name Angel to highlight that it answers queries selectively, using its
(limited) knowledge about the system, so as not to hurt the honest parties.) We get different notions of secu-
rity (all under the gES framework) by employing different Imaginary Angels. The security notion obtained
using an Imaginary Angel Γ will be denoted by Γ-ES. Note that if Γ is a “null-angel” (which returns ⊥
whenever queried), the notion of Γ-ES is identical to that of ES.
At this point we can sketch the results in this work:
1. For every (say) exponential time Imaginary Angel Γ, Γ-ES implies rES. (Theorem 1.)
2. For every Imaginary Angel Γ, Γ-ES protocols are universally composable (i.e., multiple Γ-ES proto-
cols remain Γ-ES when deployed together). (Theorem 2.)
3. There exists an Imaginary Angel Ψ such that there are Ψ-ES protocols for commitment, ZK proofs
and indeed any PPT functionality (under new complexity assumptions). (Theorem 3.)
Roughly, the Imaginary Angel Ψ will be designed so that it will answer queries which will allow break-
ing the security of already corrupted parties (and thus will be of good use to the ideal world adversary in
carrying out the simulation), but will be unhelpful in breaking the security of the honest parties.
3We stress that an Imaginary Angel, considered available to the environment and the adversary, is only
for the purpose of deﬁning and analyzing security; the actual parties in protocols do not have access to the
Imaginary Angel.
Meaningfulness of the New Notion As discussed above, usually an ideal world employing the ideal
functionality captures the security requirements even when the adversary has unbounded powers (and in
particular, access to the Imaginary Angel Γ). This is usually the case in most interesting applications: like e-
commerce or database transactions, secure communication, and genereally various multi-party computation
tasks. In such cases the notion of relaxed Environmental Security (rES) is sufﬁcient. Then, since Γ-ES is
a stronger notion of security than (i.e., implies) rES, for any Imaginary Angel Γ, guaranteeing generalized
Environmental Security is meaningful and sufﬁcient.
However there may be some situations where the extra power for the adversary is not entirely “ideal”–
for instance consider playing online poker against human players in the Γ-ES-model, using (in the ideal
world) an ideal functionality which interacts with the players. In the ideal world the players have access to
an Imaginary Angel Γ, and they may, in principle, ﬁnd that useful in ﬁnding a good strategy for the game.1
However typically an Imaginary Angel is designed to break some speciﬁc cryptographic problem (as will be
apparent with the Imaginary Angel Ψ we will use in this work) and access to it is presumably not useful in a
game of poker. Thus, even in many of these situations, where it is not entirely ideal to allow unlimited power
to the adversary in the ideal world, the security guarantee provided by Γ-ES-model may be considered good
for all practical purposes.
It is instructive to consider what the notion of rES yields in terms of the familiar notions of security. We
note that under the more traditional measures of security, in many cases rES security implies security some-
what stronger than that implied by ES/UC-security. For instance consider CCA2 security of encryption.
Any encryption scheme which rES-realizes the commitment functionality , is in fact CCA2 secure2 even for
exponential time adversaries. But on the other hand, the traditional deﬁnition of Zero Knowledge proofs and
non-malleable commitments depend on simulation; so it may not be true that a protocol which rES-realizes
the zero-knowledge proof functionality is a Zero-Knowledge proof under the traditional deﬁnition. Nev-
ertheless the Witness Indistinguishable property of that protocol does get translated to (a stronger) Witness
Indistinguishable property under the traditional deﬁnition (stronger, because it holds against exponential
time). Similarly, for non-malleability of commitments, an indistinguishability based deﬁnition is satisﬁed
by a protocol which rES-realizes the commitment functionality .
Avoiding the Impossibility Results It is interesting to observe how this work manages to evade the im-
possibility results from [3, 4, 6] (while still retaining composability). First, let us brieﬂy recall the result
showing that under the ES/UC-framework, commitment functionality cannot be securely realized in the
plain model (impossibility for other functionalities are similar in spirit). Suppose, for contradiction, there
is indeed such a protocol between the sender C and receiver R. The proof proceeds by considering two
“real world” situations A and B. In situation A, the adversary corrupts C and directs it to act transparently
between the environment and R. The environment will run an honest commitment protocol (on behalf of
C), and so the receiver will accept the commitment (and later a reveal). Since the protocol is ES/UC-secure,
there exists a simulator SA which can effect the same commitment and reveal in the “ideal world.” In other
1If there are no human players involved, one could use an ideal functionality which requires the players to turn in their programs
a priori, and carry out the game according to that.
2This follows from the fact that the ideal encryption functionality provides unconditional secrecy, and an attack in the real world
translates via the simulator into an attack in the ideal world.
4words SA can extract the committed bit from the protocol messages (so that it can send it to the ideal com-
mitment functionality). Now consider situation B, where the receiver R is corrupted. The contradiction is
achieved by considering an adversary AB which directs R to act honestly, but sends all the messages also
to an internal copy of SA. Now SA is essentially in the same position as in situation A and can extract the
committed bit, from the honest sender’s commitment. However this violates the security of the protocol,
leading to the contradiction.
We note that just allowing the adversary (real and ideal) acess to more computational resources does not
by itself stop the above proof from going through. AB can still run SA internally and violate the protocol’s
security, as it has the same computational powers as SA. So we would like to make sure that AB cannot run
SA, presumably because SA has more computational powers than AB. But on the other hand, for the UC
theorem to hold, the environment (and hence the adversary) should be able to internally run the simulators.
In other words, the composition is known to hold only when the protocol is secure in environments which
can be as powerful as the simulators.3 In our work too, we use (an extension of) the UC theorem, and need
to give the environment all the power of the simulator. So it would seem that we cannot prevent AB from
being able to run SA.
However, as mentioned earlier, we manage to get out of this apparent deadlock as we allow the power
of the environment/simulator to depend on the set of corrupted parties. The key factor is that the Imaginary
Angel, to which the environment/simulator have access, will base its answers to queries on the set of cor-
rupted parties. Note that above, in situations A and B, the set of corrupted parties are different. This lets us
make sure that AB in situation B cannot run SA (which expects to be in situation B), because the Imaginary
Angel behaves differently in the two situations. This prevents the proof from going through. Indeed, as our
results show, the new model prevents not just the proof, but also the impossibility.
Our Assumptions The protocols we construct are proven secure in the Ψ-ES model, where Ψ is a speciﬁc
Imaginary Angel related to a hash function H that we assume4 to exist. While our assumptions are new
and therefore not standard, we believe they are quite likely to be true. (For further discussion, see next
section.) As a demonstration of the plausibility of this assumption, we show how to implement H and Ψ
in the standard UC model with Common Reference String, assuming only that one-way functions exist. In
particular, this also shows that our protocols give rise to UC-secure protocols in the CRS model, when the
hash function is instantiated according to the construction we suggest. In this sense, our protocols are ”no
worse” than CRS UC protocols.
Motivations, Our Work, and Previous Work Soon after the UC framework was deﬁned, it was observed
that many important cryptographic tasks including commitment and zero knowledge, were impossible in
the standard model [3, 4, 6]. Furthermore, it was recently shown that any model (with polynomial-time
adversaries) seeking general composability in an “ideal” world / “real” world framework would suffer from
the same impossibility results as the UC model [18]. Thus, if one seeks general composability in the plain
setting with no setup assumptions, the deﬁnitions must be changed in some signiﬁcant manner. In our Γ-ES
model, where Γ is allowed to base it answers to queries on the set of corrupted parties, these impossibility
results no longer hold.5 Indeed, based on the assumptions outlined above, in Theorem 3 we show how to
3In particular, it can be shown that the notion of relaxed Environmental Security is not composable.
4We stress that our assumptions are speciﬁc computational assumptions, for which a mathematical proof or refutation could
exist. We are not assuming the existence of random oracles, or any other such “mythical” object.
5If Γ is a ﬁxed function (which does not depend on the set of corrupted parties), results of [3, 4, 6] will still imply impossibility
of securely realizing the functionalities even if the adversary has access to Γ.
5use the new framework to securely realize any multi-party computation with dishonest majority (for static
adversaries), arguably the Holy Grail of modern cryptography, without any set-up assumptions. (However
we do this only for the case of static adversaries. Extending this to adaptive adversaries is left as an open
problem here.)
We stress that prior to our work, under any kinds of computational assumptions, in the plain model
very little was known regarding composability. Essentially, all results only deal with self-composability of
2-party protocols, not general composability. This work started with a sequence of work on Concurrent
Zero Knowledge [11, 26, 16, 22], where an arbitrary polynomial number of concurrent executions can be
handled. For general 2-party computations, recently it was shown that in the plain model self-composition
for a bounded number of concurrent executions can be handled [17, 21]. We stress that our result is for
general composition of general multi-party computation protocols for an unbounded number of concurrent
executions. This result was only known previously in the presence of a trusted common reference string [7].
Finally, we point out that our protocols are conceptually simpler than the corresponding ones in [7]
(and of course, do not use the common reference string). We believe that the new framework will lead to
considerably more efﬁcient and intuitive protocols.
NewTools andTechniques In ordertodevelopthemulti-party computationprotocol, aswell asto provide
a re-usable toolkit in the new model, we observe that the original Universal Composition theorem extends
to our setting too. Thus, much of the convenience offered by the UC framework carries over to the Γ-ES
model.
We introduce some interesting techniques on the way to developing our ﬁnal protocol. We characterize
the security of certain simple intermediate protocols (BCOM and BZK) in terms of non-standard functionali-
ties that we introduce, tailor-made to suit these protocols. This is in contrast to the standard role of function-
alities in the UC framework. Indeed we suggest such non-standard functionalities as a way to demonstrate
some level of security and composability in natural or simple protocols, a line further explored in [24]. A
somewhat similar idea appears in [5] also, in the context of secure Key-Exchange. Our non-standard func-
tionalities are designed to capture the secrecy requirements; but the correctness requirements need to be
proven separately, “stepping outside” the Γ-ES framework. We point out that this is in contrast with the
treatment of correctness and secrecy requirements in the ES/UC model.
Finally, for our Ψ-ES model with Imaginary Angel Ψ, we show how to implement the Angel and related
assumptions in the CRS model, assuming only one-way functions. This may be of independent interest.
Going forward with the New Model The new model of generalized Environmental Security opens up
a whole range of exciting possibilities. However we point out that one needs to be careful to understand
the subtleties while working in this model. Firstly, the user is required to imagine that the adversary has
super-polynomial computing resources, though in reality this is not the case. When a new protocol is
deployed in the system, Γ-ES-model allows it to be analyzed in the ideal world, i.e., replace all the earlier
protocols by their ideal counterparts and then analyze the newly introduced protocol. However note that in
the Γ-ES-model the environment and adversary have access to the Imaginary Angel Γ. Ignoring this fact
may leave the new protocol open to vulnerabilities as it is deployed along with the other Γ-ES-protocols.
The recommended (and the provably secure) way is to model every task as an ideal functionality and use a
Γ-ES-realization to carry it out.
Note that in the Γ-ES-model, Γ is a single Imaginary Angel that deﬁnes the security model. If a protocol
is shown secure in the Γ0-ES-model for another Imaginary Angel Γ0, it may not compose with a Γ-ES-
protocol. We point out that this is usually not a big problem because the speciﬁc nature of the Imaginary
6Angel will be used only for basic primitives and all other functionalities are built on top of it. For instance,
in this work we use an Imaginary Angel Ψ to realize a basic commitment functionality, which the other
protocols build on. However it is the case that computational assumptions will typically need to be made
relative to the Imaginary Angel. So it is desirable to have a standard Imaginary Angel model (or at most
a few), relative to which the usual assumptions (one-way functions, trap-door permutations etc.) are well
studied.
Thoughcandidatesforourcurrentassumptionsmaybeinstantiatedbyusingsomepopularcryptographic
hash function used in practice, the assumptions we make about them are non-standard. The main problem
left open by this work is to use more standard and better studied assumptions. Indeed, it will be interesting
to come up with entirely new constructions and Imaginary Angels, for which the corresponding assumptions
are better understood. Another possibility is to use “complexity leveraging” techniques to reduce some of
the assumptions to more standard ones. See Section 2.3 for a discussion.
2 Preliminaries
Notation For two distributions X and Y with security parameter k, we write X ≈ Y to mean that X and
Y are indistinguishable by probabilistic polynomial (in k) size circuits. We denote the distribution f(X) by
the set notation {f(x)|x ← X}.
2.1 Relaxed Environmental Security
The model for the deﬁntion of relaxed Environmental Security (rES) is the same as the ES/UC model in [3]
(see below for details on the model), except we do not require that the ideal world adversaries be PPT. The
deﬁnition of security below allows the ideal world adversary to be super-polynomial. The other entities are
implicitly assumed to be PPT (though the deﬁnition of security does not inherently require so). The REAL,
IDEAL and HYBRID executions are deﬁned exactly as in [3]6. Also, the distributions of the environment’s
output (REALπ,A,Z and IDEALF,S,Z below) are deﬁned as in [3].
Deﬁnition 1 A protocol π is said to rES-realize the functionality F against the class C of adversaries
relaxed to the class C∗ of ideal adversaries if ∀A ∈ C, ∃S ∈ C∗ such that ∀Z, IDEALF,S,Z ≈ REALπ,A,Z.
2.2 Generalized Environmental Security: The Γ-ES Model
The Γ-ES model is the same as the ES/UC model in [3], except that the adversary and the environment
are given access to an “Imaginary Angel” Γ. This is the case in the real, ideal and hybrid executions, as
deﬁned in the ES/UC model (see below). We stress, however, that all protocols and honest parties are still
polynomial-time, without any Imaginary Angels. The Imaginary Angel is merely a means of deﬁning and
analyzing security. We allow the Imaginary Angel to base it answers on the set of corrupted parties. An
Imaginary Angel Γ takes in a query q and returns an answer Γ(q,X), where X is the set of corrupted parties
at the time the query is made. We point out that there is a single Imaginary Angel Γ throughout the Γ-ES
model.
Real, Ideal and Hybrid executions with an Imaginary Angel We deﬁne REALΓ execution (with parties
P1,...,Pn running protocol π, an adversary AΓ, and an environment ZΓ) just like the REAL execution in
6Figures 1., 2. and 3. in [3]
7[3] except that now the adversary AΓ and environment ZΓ have access to the Imaginary Angel Γ, which they
may query any number of times. Analogous to REALπ,A,Z in [3], we deﬁne REALΓ
π,AΓ,ZΓas the distribution
ensemble (one distribution for each choice of security parameter and input to the parties) on the output
produced by ZΓ on interacting with the parties running protocol π and the adversary AΓ.
Similarly the IDEALΓ execution is deﬁned exactly like the IDEAL execution in [3], except that the en-
vironment ZΓ and the ideal-execution adversary SΓ have access to the Imaginary Angel Γ. Analogous to
IDEALF,S,Z, we deﬁne IDEALΓ
F,SΓ,ZΓas the distribution ensemble of the output of ZΓ on interacting with
the “dummy” parties, the ideal functionality F and the ideal adversary (simulator) SΓ.
Finally, the HYBΓ execution is deﬁned as the hybrid execution in [3], except that the environment ZΓ
and the hybrid-execution adversary HΓ have access to the Imaginary Angel Γ. Analogous to HYBF
π,H,Z,
HYB
Γ,F
π,HΓ,ZΓ denotes the distribution ensemble on the output of ZΓ on interacting with the parties running
protocol π in the F-hybrid model (with multiple copies of F) and the hybrid-execution adversary HΓ. 7
Note that above, if Γ is a polynomial time computable function (in particular if it is a trivial function
which returns ⊥ on all input), then the modiﬁed model is identical to the original ES/UC model.
Deﬁnition 2 A protocol π is said to Γ-ES-realize the functionality F against the class C of adversaries. if
∀AΓ ∈ C, ∃SΓ ∈ C such that ∀ZΓ, IDEALΓ
F,SΓ,ZΓ ≈ REALΓ
π,AΓ,ZΓ.
The ﬁrst thing we point out about this deﬁnition (which depends on the particular Imaginary Angel Γ)
is that it implies relaxed Environmental Security.
Theorem 1 Let C be a class of adversaries. Let C0 ⊇ C be a class of adversaries with access to some
Imaginary Angel Γ and C∗ the class of adversaries obtained from adversaries in C0 by replacing oracle
access to Γ by a (super-polynomial time) machine which implements Γ. Then, if a protocol π Γ-ES-realizes
the functionality F against C0 then π rES-realizes the functionality F against C relaxed to C∗.
Proof: This is a simple consequence of the deﬁnitions. If π Γ-ES-realizes the functionality F against C0,
then ∀AΓ ∈ C0, ∃SΓ ∈ C0 such that ∀ZΓ, IDEALΓ
F,SΓ,ZΓ ≈ REALΓ
π,AΓ,ZΓ. In particular ∀A ∈ C, ∃SΓ ∈ C0
such that ∀Z, IDEALΓ
F,SΓ,ZΓ ≈ REALΓ
π,AΓ,ZΓ (by simply restricting the universally quantiﬁed adversaries
to C ⊆ C0 and environments to those not accessing Γ). Now for each SΓ ∈ C0 there is an S∗ ∈ C∗ which
replaces the oracle calls to Γ by (a super-polynomial time) computation. Further IDEALF,S∗,Z is identical
to IDEALΓ
F,SΓ,ZΓ. Clearly REALΓ
π,AΓ,ZΓis identical to REALπ,A,Z. Thus we get that ∀A ∈ C, ∃S∗ ∈ C∗
such that ∀Z, IDEALF,S,Z ≈ REALπ,A,Z. Thus, by deﬁnition, π rES-realizes the functionality F against C
relaxed to C∗. 
The following is a restatement of the UC theorem in [3], where we replace the REAL and HYBRID
executions by REALΓ and HYBΓ executions respectively. The theorem holds for adaptive adversaries as
well. The proof (as well as an extension to the specialized simulator case and a simple generalization of the
setting) appears in Appendix B.
Theorem 2 (Extended Universal Composition Theorem) Let C be a class of adversaries with access to
the Imaginary Angel Γ, and F be an ideal functionality. Let π be an n-party protocol in the F-hybrid model
7By abuse of notation, sometimes we will use REAL
Γ
π,AΓ,ZΓ, IDEAL
Γ
F,SΓ,ZΓand HYB
Γ,F
π,HΓ,ZΓ to denote (the distribution of)
the entire view of the environment Z
Γ, instead of (the distribution of) just its output.
8and let ρ be an n-party protocol that Γ-ES-realizes F against adversaries of class C. Then, ∀AΓ ∈ C, ∃ (a
hybrid-model adversary) HΓ ∈ C such that ∀ZΓ we have:
REALΓ
πρ,AΓ,ZΓ ≈ HYB
Γ,F
π,HΓ,ZΓ
All the parties are assumed to have unique IDs, but possibly chosen adversarially. Like in previous
works on Universally Composable multi-party computation, we work in the authenticated channels model.
2.3 The Hash Function, the Imaginary Angel and the Assumptions
In this work, we use hash functions with concrete assumptions. Below we sketch the assumptions we use in
this work.
We assume a hash function H : {0,1}k → {0,1}` , with the following properties: The k-bit input to H
is considered to be an element (µ,r,x,b) ∈ I × {0,1}k1 × {0,1}k2 × {0,1}, where I is the set of IDs used
for the parties, and k1,k2,` are all polynomially related to k. Then,
A1 (Collisions and Indistinguishability): For every µ ∈ I and r ∈ {0,1}k1, there is a distribution D
µ
r over
{(x,y,z)|H(µ,r,x,0) = H(µ,r,y,1) = z} 6= φ, such that
{(x,z)|(x,y,z) ← Dµ
r} ≈ {(x,z)|x ← {0,1}k2,z = H(µ,r,x,0)}
{(y,z)|(x,y,z) ← Dµ
r} ≈ {(y,z)|y ← {0,1}k2,z = H(µ,r,y,1)}
Further, even if the distinguisher is given sampling access to the set of distributions {D
µ0
r0 |µ0 ∈ I,r0 ∈
{0,1}k1}, these distributions still remain indistinguishable.
A2 (Difﬁcult to ﬁnd collisions with same preﬁx): For all PPT circuits M and every id µ ∈ I, for a
random r ← {0,1}k1, probability that M(r) outputs (x,y) such that H(µ,r,x,0) = H(µ,r,y,1)
is negligible. This remains true even when M is given sampling access to the set of distributions
{D
µ0
r0 |µ0 6= µ,r0 ∈ {0,1}k1}.
The ﬁrst assumption simply states that there are collisions in the hash function, which are indistinguishable
from a random hash of 0 or 1. Note that this assumption implies that for every µ ∈ I and every r ∈ {0,1}k1
H(µ,r,{0,1}k2,0) and H(µ,r,{0,1}k2,1) are indistinguishable (because they are indistinguishable from
{z|(x,y,z) ← D
µ
r}).
We make one more cryptographic assumption for our constructions:
A3 There exists a family of trapdoor permutations T over {0,1}n, which remains secure even if the
adversary has sampling access to D
µ
r for all µ and r.
We use the notation (f,f−1) ← T to specify generating a permutation f : {0,1}n → {0,1}n and its
inverse (trapdoor) f−1. We let B(·) denote a hardcore predicate associated with this permutation, which
retains its security even if the adversary has sampling access to D
µ
r for all µ and r, (for instance, it is easy
to see that the Goldreich-Levin bit [14] continues to be a hardcore predicate as required, under Assump-
tion A3). We will also need a perfectly binding (non-interactive) commitment scheme C, whose hiding
property (in a stand-alone setting) holds against PPT adversaries with access to the distributions D
µ
r for all
µ and r. C can be readily constructed from T and B.
9Plausibility of Our Assumptions. Our set of assumptions on our hash function essentially give it the
nature of a kind of non-malleable commitment (NMC). We make several observations here. NMC in the
standard model is something that has been known to exist for over a decade [10], and recently even constant-
round NMC has been realized in the standard model [1]. Further work on realizing simple NMC under
standard complexity assumptions remains an important and exciting research area, partly because, tanta-
lizingly, NMC is essentially something we know most functions satisfy (in the sense that a random oracle
realizes it immediately), and it is something we expect any “sufﬁciently unstructured” hash function (such
as something like SHA) to satisfy; indeed we know that just one-way functions sufﬁce to implement NMC
in the CRS model [9, 8]. We make these observations to highlight two points: First, assuming that some
hash function has NMC-like properties is not at all unreasonable. Second, since NMC is already known to
exist, but known NMC protocols do not (and indeed cannot) yield the results we want, what we are doing is
not just trivial given NMC – i.e. we are not making an assumption which “obviously” implies the goal we
want to achieve.
As further evidence of the plausibility of our assumptions, we show that our hash functions, our as-
sumptions, and the Imaginary Angel below can be realized in the CRS model assuming only that one-way
functions exist; see Section 7. The fact that only one-way functions are needed to realize our assumptions in
the CRS model gives further evidence that Assumption A3 is valid, since it is about trapdoor primitives, as
opposed to merely one-way primitives.
Complexity Leveraging to Reduce Assumptions By choosing parameters appropriately, at least one of
our assumptions can be reduced to a more standard one. Speciﬁcally, Assumption A3, which assumes trap-
doorpermutationssecureagainstadversarieswithsamplingaccesstoD
µ
r canbereplacedwithanassumption
of trapdoor permutations secure against super-polynomial adversaries.
Consider choosing the domain of the trapdoor permutation {0,1}n such that the input size of the hash
function k = n, for some constant 0 <  < 1. Then we can safely replace Assumption A3 by the as-
sumption that the trapdoor permutations are secure against circuits of size 2n
. This implies Assumption A3
(given Assumptions A1 and A2) because a circuit of size 2k = 2n
can represent the distributions D
µ
r for
all (µ,r). Note that this is only to change the assumption to a more standard one (trapdoor permutations
secure against sub-exponential circuits), and has no effect on the model. In particular, we are not changing
the power of the real or ideal adversaries.
The Imaginary Angel Ψ Suppose X is the set of corrupted parties. (Since we are dealing with static
adversaries, this is a ﬁxed set). On query (µ,r) the Imaginary Angel Ψ checks if µ ∈ X, i.e., if the party
with ID µ is corrupted or not. If it is, Ψ draws a sample from D
µ
r described above and returns it; else it
returns ⊥. The results in this work are in the Ψ-ES-model.
2.4 Conventions
Wepointoutafewconventionswefollowinthiswork. AllpartiesandfunctionalitiesreferredtointheΓ-ES-
model are (uniform or non-uniform) probabilistic polynomial time machines. Adversaries and environments
are non-uniform PPT machines. The functionalities do not have access to any information about the system
other than what the honest parties would have– in particular, a functionality would not know the set of
corrupted parties. (In [7] such functionalities are referred to as “well-formed.”)
When we say a protocol Γ-ES-realizes a functionality against static adversaries, we require that it be
a non-trivial protocol (as deﬁned in [7]): i.e., if the real world adversary corrupts no parties and forwards
10all messages promptly, the ideal world adversary (simulating the real-world execution with the protocol) is
required do the same.
The following restrictions of the class of adversaries are standard. A static adversary can corrupt the
parties only at the onset of computation. A semi-honest (or passive) adversary has read-only access to the
internal state of the corrupted parties, but cannot modify the program run by the parties.
The following notation is also standard: if Π is a protocol in the F-hybrid model (with Imaginary Angel
Γ) and π is a protocol which securely realizes F (with respect to Γ) in F0-hybrid model, then the protocol
Ππ is a protocol in the F0-hybrid model obtained from Π by replacing interaction with F by interaction
with programs implementing the protocol π.
3 Secure Multi-Party Computation in the Ψ-ES Model
In this section we present our main result: for any multi-party computation (MPC) functionality F, a pro-
tocol which Ψ-ES-realizes F against static adversaries. The overall structure of our Secure multi-party
computation protocol follows that in [7], which in turn follows [15, 13]. But we differ from [7] in a very
crucial manner: we introduce basic tools and protocols which allow us to achieve security (in the Ψ-ES
model), without a Common Random String.
3.1 One-to-many Commit-and-prove
Following [7], ﬁrst we construct a protocol which Ψ-ES-realizes F1:M
CP against static adversaries, where F1:M
CP
is the “One-to-Many Commit-and-Prove” functionality shown in Figure 8 (see Section 6).
Lemma 1 Under assumptions A1, A2 and A3, there is a protocol OM-CP which Ψ-ES-realizes F1:M
CP against
static adversaries.
Lemma 1 contains the central contribution of this work. In Sections 4 and 5 we build tools for proving
it, and in Section 6 we give the proof.
3.2 MPC from Commit-and-prove
Given Lemma 1, the rest of the construction closely follows that in [7]. First we begin with a protocol which
Ψ-ES-realizes F against static semi-honest adversaries. A semi-honest adversary is one which does not
alter the behaviour of the parties it corrupts (see [7] for more details). Then using Lemma 1 we construct
a protocol compiler which can take a protocol secure against semi-honest (static) adversaries and generates
a protocol secure against general (static) adversaries, thereby completing the proof. These two steps are
further elaborated below. For full details we refer the reader to [7].
MPCforSemi-HonestParties Ingeneral, alltheproofsforthesemi-honestcasefrom[7]areinformation-
theoretic, and immediately imply their Ψ-ES analogs. First, we observe that the Oblivious Transfer func-
tionality (denoted by FOT) is realized by the same protocol as in [15, 13, 7]. The proof as given in [7] that
the protocol securely realizes FOT with respect to semi-honest static adversaries carries over directly to the
Ψ-ES model, under Assumption A3.
This allows us to work in the FOT-hybrid model. Again, the protocols for semi-honest parties, in the
FOT-hybrid model carry over exactly as they are given in [7]. As observed there, there is no assumption on
the computational power of the adversary and environment in the proof of security (under the FOT-hybrid
11model). Thus, using the secure realization of FOT with respect to Ψ above, we get a secure multi-party
computation protocol for semi-honest parties in the Ψ-ES model.
From the above, we conclude following:
Lemma 2 (Following [7]): Under Assumption A3, for any multi-party functionality F, there exists a proto-
col which Ψ-ES-realizes F against semi-honest static adversaries.
ProtocolCompiler Asmentionedabove, tocompletetheconstruction, weneedtoshowhowtoconvertthe
above protocol for semi-honest parties into one secure against malicious parties. We note that the compiler
given in [7] under the F1:M
CP -hybrid model works in the Ψ-ES model as well. The proof in [7] that this
compiler works in the F1:M
CP -hybrid model is information-theoretic, and holds for all classes of adversaries
and environments; hence it is easily veriﬁed that the proof carries over to the Ψ-ES model.
Lemma 3 (Following [7]): There exists a protocol compiler Comp which takes a multi-party protocol Π,
and outputs a protocol Comp(Π) in the F1:M
CP -hybrid model such that, for every protocol Π and static
adversary AΨ, there exists a semi-honest static adversary A0Ψ such that for every environment ZΨ,
REALΨ
Π,A0Ψ,ZΨ ≡ HYB
Ψ,F1:M
CP
Comp(Π),AΨ,ZΨ
Our main theorem readily follows.
Theorem 3 Under assumptions A1, A2 and A3, there is a protocol which Ψ-ES-realizes any multi-party
functionality8 against static adversaries.
PROOF (SKETCH). Consider any multi-party functionality F. By Lemma 2 there is a protocol Π which
Ψ-ES-realizes F against semi-honest static adversaries. Applying Lemma 3, we obtain a protocol Π0 =
Comp(Π) in the F1:M
CP -hybrid model against (possibly malicious) static adversaries. Finally using Lemma 1
and the composition theorem, we get that Π0OM-CP Ψ-ES-realizes F against (possibly malicious) static ad-
versaries. 
The rest of the paper (till Section 7) is devoted to proving Lemma 1.
4 Basic Building Blocks
In this section, we build the basic functionalities we need to achieve the result of secure (static) multi-party
computation in the Ψ-ES model. Because we are not availing of any common reference string, our path
is a bit more complicated than it would be otherwise. We introduce a new modeling and proof technique
based on intermediate non-standard functionalities. In some cases, to establish our results, we need to “step
outside” the Ψ-ES framework, because our intermediate functionalities do not fully capture the security
properties we need from our protocols for their later application. This section develops all the tools we’ll
need to realize the commitment functionality in the Ψ-ES model, which we’ll do in the next section.
A note about session-ID’s. In the UC framework, and similarly in our Ψ-ES framework, every functionality
should be instantiated with a unique session-ID in order to distinguish it from other instantiations. This is
an important part of the modeling, but it can be distracting in (often already complicated) protocols and
functionality speciﬁcations. For sake of ease of reading, we omit session-ID’s from our description, but
8see Section 2.4.
12they are implicit9. When we need to specify the session-ID, we use the notation F[sid] to denote a copy of
the functionality F invoked with session-ID sid. Messages to and from F[sid] are tagged with sid. Every
protocol invocation also has an associated unique session-ID sid. Again, the parties would have agreed on
sid before the protocol starts. All messages in the protocol are tagged by sid, and when a party receives a
message tagged by sid it is forwarded to the program running the protocol with that session-ID. Agreeing
upon the session-ID is not part of the functionality or protocol: while describing the protocol or functionality
we leave out specifying how the session-IDs are agreed upon.
But when an ideal functionality F is invoked from within a protocol π (or another functionality, as the
case may be) that we describe, as part of the desciption of π we need to specify how the session-ID of that
invocation of F is decided. In general, one can simply pass on the same session-ID as of π, annotated
with a unique identiﬁer that lets us refer to the functionality being called. For instance, if a protocol π
with session-ID sid, uses n copies of the functionality F, it will instantiate those copies as F[(sid1)],
F[(sid2)], ... F[(sidn)], where sidi could simply be sid concatenated with i. In Section 4.2 we illustrate
this convention by explicitly incorporating this in the speciﬁcation of the protocol BCOM∗ (Figure 2).
4.1 Basic Commitment Protocol
In Figure 1(a) we give a protocol BCOM for commitment, in the FENC-hybrid. FENC is the encryption
functionality, which receives a message from a party and delivers it to the destination party, publishing the
length of the message to the adversary.
We will use protocol BCOM as a component in later protocols. Thus we would like to show some sort
of composable security for this protocol. But note that this protocol cannot be a Ψ-ES secure commitment
protocol (in particular, it does not provide a way for a simulator to extract the values committed to by a
corrupted sender). So we introduce a novel technique to formalize and analyze the security of this protocol.
Lemma 4 Protocol BCOM Ψ-ES-realizesF g COM showninFigure1(b)againststaticadversaries, intheFENC-
hybrid model.
PROOF (SKETCH). For every PPT adversary AΨ we demonstrate a PPT simulator SΨ such that no PPT
environment ZΨ can distinguish between interacting with the parties and AΨ in the REALΨ world, and
interacting with the parties and SΨ in the IDEALΨ world.
SΨ internally runs AΨ (which expects to work in the FENC-hybrid with the parties running the BCOM
protocol), and works as an interface between AΨ and the parties. When AΨ starts the BCOM protocol, SΨ
initiates a session with the IDEAL functionality. If AΨ corrupts both parties, SΨ allows it to directly interact
with them. Below we consider the other three possible cases.
Both C,R honest If AΨ corrupts neither of the two parties C and R, then all it sees are the random string
r from R to C, and the message from FENC giving the length of the commit and reveal messages from C.
So by knowing the parameters k1,k2,` (which we assume it does) SΨ can perfectly simulate the protocol
to AΨ. (Encryption is used in the protocol speciﬁcally to take care of the situation where the adversary
corrupts neither parties.)
9Because there is no “joint state” represented by a CRS, we are in the lucky and relatively simple situation of only having
to associate a single session-ID to each functionality (as opposed to a session-ID and a sub-session-ID). So almost all of the
“complications” of dealing with multiple session-ID’s that arise in [7] do not arise for us. This is one reason we feel comfortable
omitting them from the protocol description, to avoid clutter.
13Protocol BCOM
The parties are a sender or committer C, and a receiver R. The security parameter is k, and k1,k2 are
polynomial in k. The sender C gets as input a bit b, which it wants to commit to.
COMMIT PHASE:
1. R picks r ← {0,1}k1 and sends it to C.
2. C chooses r0 ← {0,1}k2 and computes c = H(µR,r,r0,b). C requests FENC to send c to R.
3. R receives c from FENC and accepts the commitment.
REVEAL PHASE:
1. C requests FENC to send (b,r0) to R, which the receiver R receives.
2. R checks if H(µR,r,r0,b) = c. If so it accepts b as revealed.
(a) The Basic Commitment Protocol (BCOM)
Functionality F g COM
The parties are sender C and receiver R, with an adversary SΨ. The security parameter is k, and k1,k2
are polynomial in k.
COMMIT PHASE:
1. Fg COM picks r ← {0,1}k1 and sends it to C.
2. Fg COM receives c from C.
3. Fg COM sends the message COMMIT to R
REVEAL PHASE:
1. Fg COM receives (b,r0) from C
2. Fg COM checks if H(µR,r,r0,b) = c. If so it sends the message (REVEAL,b) to R and the adversary
SΨ.
(b) A functionality realized by the protocol BCOM
Figure 1: The Basic Commitment Protocol and a Functionality it realizes.
R honest, C corrupted Suppose the adversary corrupts only the sender C. Note that there is very little
difference between what C sees in the real and ideal executions. In fact SΨ simply forwards the messages
from AΨ (meant for FENC, to be delivered to R) to F g COM (as if it was indeed sent to R via FENC), and reports
to AΨ the message from F g COM (as if it came from R). It is easily veriﬁed that this is a good simulation.
C honest, R corrupted Finally, suppose that the adversary corrupts the receiver alone. When AΨ sends
out the ﬁrst message r in the protocol, SΨ sends a query (µR,r) to the Imaginary Angel Ψ and (since R
is corrupted), receives (x,y,z) ← D
µR
r , where D
µR
r is the distribution over {(x,y,z)|H(µR,r,x,0) =
H(µR,r,y,1) = z} as speciﬁed in the assumption on H. Then, when F g COM gives the COMMIT message,
SΨ sends z to AΨ as a message from the REAL sender. Later if F g COM gives the message (REVEAL,0), then
14SΨ sends (0,x) to AΨ, and if F g COM gives the message (REVEAL,1), then SΨ sends (1,y) to AΨ. Under the
assumption A1 on D
µ
r, we have that ZΨ cannot distinguish between the real execution and the simulation.

A priori the functionality F g COM does not offer any guarantee that the commitment is binding on a corrupt
sender. The following lemma formulates the binding property outside the Ψ-ES-framework (i.e., we do not
give a functionality reﬂecting the binding property).
Lemma 5 Consider a copy of F g COM interacting with a corrupt sender C and an honest receiver R, in
a system with environment ZΨ and multiple other copies of the same or other functionalities as well as
one or more protocols and adversary AΨ. Then, after ﬁnishing the commit phase, there is a ﬁxed bit b∗
(determined by the entire system state), such that C can make F g COM accept a reveal to 1 − b∗ with only
negligible probability.
Proof: We deﬁne the value of the commitment b∗ as follows: consider the entire system at the end of the
commitment phase. Let p0 be the probability of the sender (legally) revealing this commitment as 0, and the
probability p1 of the sender revealing it as 1. Let b∗ = 0 if p0 ≥ p1; else let b∗ = 1. We say that the binding
is broken if the sender manages to reveal the commitment to 1 − b∗. We shall demonstrate a (non-uniform)
PPT machine MΨ which accepts r ← {0,1}k and outputs (x,y) such that H(r,x,0) = H(r,y,1), with a
probability polynomially related to the probability of the sender breaking the binding.
MΨ simulates the system internally, starting at the point the session is initiated (which is given to it
non-uniformly). Recall that in this session the (corrupted) sender is to interact with F g COM, which chooses a
random string r ← {0,1}k and sends it to the sender. But instead, MΨ will accept r as an input and send
that as the ﬁrst message to the sender. Then the sender may respond with a string c. At this point MΨ makes
two copies of the system, and runs them with independent randomness. If the sender eventually reveals the
commitment as (x,0) in the ﬁrst run and as (y,1) in the second run, then MΨ outputs (x,y) and succeeds.
Else it fails and terminates.
Let σ denote the state of the system at the point MΨ makes a copy of the system. Deﬁne random
variable pσ
0 (respectively, pσ
1) as the probability that starting from the state σ, the sender successfully reveals
the commitment as 0 (respectively, 1). Then,
Pr[Sender reveals 1 − b∗] ≤ Eσ[min{pσ
0,pσ
1}]
≤ Eσ[
p
pσ
0pσ
1] ≤
q
Eσ[pσ
0pσ
1] =
q
Pr[MΨ succeeds]
because after forking two copies of the system, MΨ succeeds (i.e., it manages to output (x,y) such that
H(r,x,0) = H(r,y,1)) when in the ﬁrst run the event with probability pσ
0 occurs and in the second the
event with probability pσ
1. Here Eσ[f(σ)] stands for
P
σ f(σ)Pr[σ]. Note that the randomness involved in
determining Pr[σ] includes all the randomness used by MΨ to simulate the system up to the point σ, and
the input r that it receives.
Since the running time of MΨ is linearly related to the running time of the entire system, MΨ is a PPT
machine. Hence the probability that MΨ succeeds is negligible by assumption A2 (even though MΨ has
access to Ψ, as long as R is not corrupted). So the probability that the sender reveals 1−b∗ is also negligible.

154.2 Multi-bit Commitment with Selective Reveal.
We deﬁne a multi-bit version of the functionality F g COM, called F∗
g COM.
F∗
g COM is equivalent to n parallel sessions of F g COM (where n is speciﬁed by the sender C). F∗
g COM internally
runs n copies of the program for F g COM and interacts with the sender C according to them. In the commit
phase, it sends COMMIT if all n parallel copies of F g COM output COMMIT (as the message for R). In the reveal
phase, the sender can choose to run the reveal phase of any subset {i1,...,it} ⊆ [n] of parallel sessions.
Then if in reveal phase of each of the t chosen sessions, F g COM of that session outputs the reveal message
(REVEAL,bj) (intended for the receiver), then F∗
g COM sends the message (REVEAL,(i1,b1),...,(it,bt)) to
R.
Recall our convention regarding session-IDs: when a protocol is started from within another protocol,
the latter should specify how the session ID of the sub-protocol is generated and agreed upon. We make
explicit our conventions regarding how this is done, by specifying the details for the functionality F∗
g COM and
a protocol BCOM∗ for it, in Figure 2. Similar schemes can be employed for all other protocols in this work.
Let BCOM∗BCOM denote the protocol in the FENC-hybrid model which is obtained from BCOM∗ by re-
placing F g COM invocations by the protocol BCOM. Then it is easy to show the following lemmas. The ﬁrst
follows from the fact that Lemma 5 holds in a general setting, and from a union bound. The second follows
from the composition theorem (Theorem 2). We omit the proofs.
Lemma 6 In a setting as in Lemma 5, after ﬁnishing the commit phase with F∗
g COM, there is a ﬁxed string in
{0,1}n (where n is the number of bits as speciﬁed by C at the beginning of the protocol) such that C can
make F∗
g COM accept a (selective) reveal inconsistent with that string with only negligible probability.
Lemma 7 There is a protocol which Ψ-ES-realizes F∗
g COM against static adversaries, in the FENC-hybrid
model.
4.3 Basic Zero Knowledge Proof
Consider a proto-typical 3-round Zero Knowledge Proof protocol (a Σ-protocol) for proving membership in
an NP-complete language (like 3-colorability or Hamiltonicity), in which the prover uses the basic commit-
ment functionality F g COM from above, to carry out the commitments (ﬁrst round) and the reveals (last round).
Let us denote this protocol by BZK. Then, like we deﬁned F g COM from BCOM, we can deﬁne a basic Zero
Knowledge Proof functionality Ff ZK from BZK. The description of the functionality is simple: Ff ZK interacts
with the prover according to the protocol BZK, playing the veriﬁers role. If the prover completes the proof
according to the protocol, Ff ZK sends a message PROVEN to the veriﬁer.
Figure3(a)givestheprotocol BZK, andFigure3(b)givesthefunctionalityFf ZK, forproving3-colorability.
Note that both BZK and Ff ZK are deﬁned in the F∗
g COM-hybrid model. (See section B.1.)
Lemma 8 Protocol BZK Ψ-ES-realizes Ff ZK against static adversaries (where BZK and Ff ZK are both in the
F∗
g COM-hybrid model).
Proof: We need to show that for every PPT adversary AΨ there is a PPT simulator SΨ such that no
PPT environment ZΨ can distinguish between interacting with the parties and AΨ in the HYBΨ world, and
interacting with the parties and SΨ in the IDEALΨ world.
SΨ internally runs AΨ (which expects to work in the FENC-hybrid with two parties P,V running a BZK
protocol), and works as an interface between AΨ and the parties. When AΨ starts the BZK protocol, SΨ
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g COM
The parties are sender C and receiver R, with an adversary SΨ. Let the session ID (already agreed up
on by C and R, on instantiating this copy of F∗
g COM) be sid. Let the input to C at the commit phase be
(b1,...,bn), the bits to which it wishes to commit, and that at the reveal phase be {i1,...,it} ⊆ [n], the
set of commitments which it wishes to reveal.
COMMIT PHASE:
1. F∗
g COM receives the number n from C.
2. F∗
g COM internally starts n copies of the program for Fg COM namely Fg COM[(sid1)],...,Fg COM[(sidn)],
with C as the sender and using the ID of R as the receiver-ID.
3. F∗
g COM lets the t parallel sessions of Fg COM interact with C in the commit phase.
4. If all the n copies of Fg COM produce the COMMIT message, then F∗
g COM sends the message COMMIT
to R and SΨ.
REVEAL PHASE:
1. F∗
g COM receives the set {i1,...,it} from C.
2. F∗
g COM lets the t parallel sessions Fg COM[(sidi1)],...,Fg COM[(sidit)] interact with C in the reveal
phase.
3. On receiving message (REVEAL,bi) from the session of Fg COM with session-ID (sidi), for all i ∈
{i1,...,it}, F∗
g COM sends (REVEAL,(i1,bi1),...,(it,bit)) to R and SΨ.
(a) Multi-bit Commitment With Selective Reveal Functionality
Protocol BCOM∗
The parties are sender C and receiver R. Let the session ID (already agreed up on by C and R, on
instantiating this copy of BCOM∗) be sid. Let the input to C at the commit phase be (b1,...,bn), the bits
to which it wishes to commit, and that at the reveal phase be {i1,...,it} ⊆ [n], the set of commitments
which it wishes to reveal.
COMMIT PHASE:
1. C sends the number n to R.
2. C and R initiate n parallel sessions of Fg COM with session-IDs (sid1),...,(sidn).
3. C interacts (in parallel) with the n sessions of Fg COM to commit to the bits b1,...,bn.
4. On receiving COMMIT message from all the n sessions, R accepts the commitment.
REVEAL PHASE:
1. C sends the set {i1,...,it} to R.
2. C interacts in parallel with the sessions of Fg COM with session-IDs (sidi1),...,(sidit) to reveal to
the bits bi1,...,bit.
3. Onreceivingmessage(REVEAL,bi)fromthesessionwithsession-ID(sidi), foralli ∈ {i1,...,it},
R accepts (i1,bi1),...,(it,bit) as the revealed information.
(b) Protocol BCOM∗ in the F g COM-hybrid model
Figure 2: The Basic Multi-bit Commitment with Selective-reveal Functionality F∗
g COM and the protocol
BCOM∗. 17Protocol BZK
The parties are prover P and veriﬁer V . The common input is a graph G([n],E). In addition, the prover
P gets a witness σ : [n] → {1,2,3}. The size of the graph n is polynomial in the security parameter k.
P veriﬁes that σ is a valid coloring of G. (Else it aborts the protocol.)
1. Repeat the following n3 times in parallel:
(a) P chooses π, a random permutation of {1,2,3}. Let bi = π(σ(i)).
(b) P interacts with F∗
g COM to commit n (2-bit) numbers (b1,...,bn) to V .
(c) V picks a random edge (i,j) ← E and sends it to P.
(d) P sends (REVEAL,{i,j}) to F∗
g COM, and interacts with it in the reveal phase to reveal
(i,bi),(j,bj)). V receives (REVEAL,(i,bi),(j,bj)) from F∗
g COM.
2. V checks if in all n3 runs bi,bj ∈ {1,2,3} and bi 6= bj. If so it accepts the proof.
(a) Basic ZK Proof Protocol (BZK) in the F∗
g COM-hybrid model
Functionality Ff ZK
The parties are prover P and veriﬁer V , with an adversary SΨ. The common input is a graph G([n],E).
The size of the graph n is polynomial in the security parameter k.
1. Repeat the following n3 times in parallel:
(a) Ff ZK interacts with F∗
g COM playing the part of the receiver (using V ’s ID) with P as sender.
(b) When F∗
g COM returns the COMMIT message Ff ZK picks a random edge (i,j) ← E and sends it
to P.
(c) Ff ZK continues interacting with P through F∗
g COM, until F∗
g COM returns a message
(REVEAL,(i,bi),(j,bj)).
2. Ff ZK checks if in all n3 runs bi 6= bj. If so it sends the message ACCEPTABLE to V and SΨ.
(b) A functionality realized by the BZK protocol
Figure 3: The Basic ZK Proof Protocol and a Functionality it realizes.
initiates a session with the IDEAL functionality. If AΨ corrupts both parties SΨ allows it to directly interact
with them. Below we consider the other three possible cases (the ﬁrst two will be handled the same way as
in the proof of security of BCOM).
Both P,V honest: Note that in the protocol BZK the only message sent by V is a random edge of G, where
as messages sent by P are all to the functionality F∗
g COM (whose contents are hidden from AΨ). Apart from
this all that AΨ sees are the COMMIT and REVEAL messages sent out by F∗
g COM, the latter being to pairs
b,b0 ← {1,2,3},b 6= b0. Clearly SΨ can perfectly simulate these messages.
V honest, P corrupted: In this case, SΨ simply forwards the messages from AΨ to F∗
g COM, and reports to
AΨ the messages from Ff ZK as if it is from V .
P honest, V corrupted: Finally, suppose that the adversary corrupts the veriﬁer. Now SΨ sends COMMIT
18messages to the corrupted V as if coming from F∗
g COM. If V responds with an (i,j) ∈ E, SΨ picks b,b0 ←
{1,2,3},b 6= b0 and sends them in a REVEAL message. Clearly this is a perfect simulation of an interaction
with the honest prover P and F∗
g COM. 
The functionality Ff ZK does not make any guarantees of soundness, a priori. But as with F g COM, we shall
demonstrate this property outside the UC/ES-framework.
Lemma 9 Consider a corrupt prover P interacting with a copy of Ff ZK and an honest veriﬁer V , in a system
with environment ZΨ and multiple other copies of the same or other functionalities as well as one or more
protocols (which can all be w.l.o.g considered part of the environment) and adversary AΨ. Then Ff ZK accepts
the proof to a false statement with negligible probability.
Proof: In each of the n3 repetitions of the commitment in the interaction of Ff ZK with P, consider the point
at which F∗
g COM sends the COMMIT message to Ff ZK. Then, by the binding property of F∗
g COM (Lemma 6), we
know that there exist values (b∗
1,...,b∗
n) such that the probability that F∗
g COM will send a reveal message with
(i,bi) for bi 6= b∗
i is negligible.
For convenience, we deﬁne the following events: Unsound is the event that Ff ZK accepts the proof
of an incorrect statement. AllBadGraphs is the event that in all the n3 sessions, bits (b∗
1,...,b∗
n) give
invalid colorings; BadCom is the event that F∗
g COM will send a reveal message with (i,bi) where bi 6= b∗
i.
AllGoodEdges is the event that in each of the n3 sessions, for the edge (i,j) selected by Ff ZK, b∗
i 6= b∗
j.
Then
Pr[Unsound] ≤ Pr[AllBadGraphs ∧ Ff ZK sends 3-COLORABLE]
≤ Pr[AllBadGraphs ∧ ( AllGoodEdges ∨ BadCom)]
≤ Pr[(AllBadGraphs ∧ AllGoodEdges) ∨ BadCom]
≤ Pr[AllBadGraphs ∧ AllGoodEdges] + Pr[BadCom]
≤ Pr[ AllGoodEdges|AllBadGraphs] + Pr[BadCom]
Now conditional on AllBadGraphs, in each session, Ff ZK will query an edge without valid colorings (as
given by b∗
1,...,b∗
n) with probability at least 1
|E| ≥ 1
n2. That is, with probability at most 1− 1
n2 it will query
an edge with a valid coloring (a good edge). So,
Pr[ AllGoodEdges|AllBadGraphs] ≤ (1 − 1/n2)n3
= 2−Ω(n)
Since Pr[BadCom] is also negligible, we conclude that Pr[Unsound] is negligible. 
5 Commitment
The basic protocols and non-standard functionalities given in the previous section now allow us to achieve
the “fully” ideal Ψ-ES commitment functionality FCOM given below. Since for the sake of simplicity in
describing our protocols we allowed the session IDs to be implicit, we do the same in specifying the func-
tionality.
Let C be a perfectly binding commitment scheme. Let Tk be a family of trapdoor-permutations (f,f−1)
on {0,1}k, which can be efﬁciently sampled (but f is a one-way-permutation by itself). B stands for a
19Functionality FCOM
The parties are a sender C and a receiver R, with adversary SΨ.
COMMIT PHASE:
C → FCOM : b
FCOM → R : COMMIT
REVEAL PHASE:
C → FCOM : REVEAL
FCOM → R,SΨ : (REVEAL,b)
Figure 4: The Commitment Functionality
hardcore predicate for the family of trapdoor permutations used. These primitives are assumed to be secure
against adversaries with access to Ψ (see Section 2.3). The protocol is based on the commit-with-extract
protocol from [2].
Protocol COM
The parties are a sender C and a receiver R. k is the security parameter.
COMMIT PHASE:
1. R draws rR ← {0,1}k and sends c = C(rR;r) where r is also drawn at random.
2. C draws (f,f−1) ← Tk and sends f to R. C interacts with Ff ZK to prove to R that
(∃r0,g : (f,g) ← Tk(r0)). R receives the message PROVEN from Ff ZK.
3. C draws rC ← {0,1}k and sends it to R.
4. R sends rR to C.
5. R interacts with Ff ZK to prove to C that (∃r0 : c = C(rR;r0)) C receives the message PROVEN from
Ff ZK.
6. Let b be the bit C wants to commit to. C compute b0 = B(f−1(rR ⊕ rC)) ⊕ b and sends b0 to R. R
accepts the commitment.
REVEAL PHASE:
1. C sends the bit b to R.
2. C interacts with Ff ZK to prove to R that (∃t : f(t) = rR ⊕ rC
V
b0 = B(t) ⊕ b).
3. Up on receiving the message PROVEN from Ff ZK, R accepts b as the revealed bit.
Figure 5: Protocol COM which Ψ-ES-realizes FCOM against static adversaries
Theorem 4 Protocol COM Ψ-ES-realizes FCOM against static adversaries, in the Ff ZK-hybrid model.
PROOF (SKETCH). Given an adversary AΨ, we need to construct a simulator SΨ such that for all envi-
ronments ZΨ, we have HYB
Ψ,Ff ZK
COM,AΨ,ZΨ ≈ IDEALΨ
FCOM,SΨ,ZΨ. As is usual, SΨ internally simulates AΨ. If
both the sender C and receiver R running the protocol COM are corrupted, SΨ lets AΨ interact with them
directly. We brieﬂy discuss the other three cases below.
20When both C and R are honest, SΨ simulates the protocol exactly until the step where the bit b is used
(Step 7). At this step, it sends out a random bit as b0. In the reveal phase SΨ can easily simulate a proof from
Ff ZK to open it either way. The hiding property of the hard-core bit B can be used to show that the simulation
is indistinguishable from an actual execution. When R is corrupt and C is honest, the same simulator works,
for the same reasons. However the reduction to the security of B becomes slightly more involved in this
case.
When R is honest and C corrupt, SΨ should be able to extract the committed bit. The idea here is that
SΨ (playing the part of R in the protocol) will cheat in the proof using the simulated Ff ZK in Step 5 (reveal
phase of the coin-ﬂipping part), and have rR ⊕ rC match a random string r such that it knows B(rR ⊕ rC).
This will allow it to extract the bit b. Soundness of Ff ZK (Lemma 9) ensures that C cannot feasibly open to a
bit other than b. Also it ensures that f is indeed a permutation, which along with the hiding property of the
commitment C ensures that the simulation is indistinguishable from an actual execution.
The full proof is somewhat tedious. See Appendix C 
Corollary 5 Under assumptions A1, A2 and A3, there is a protocol which Ψ-ES-realizes FCOM against static
adversaries.
PROOF (SKETCH). Employing the composition theorem (Theorem 2) to compose protocols in Theorem 4,
and Lemmas 4 and 8, we conclude that there is a protocol in the FENC-hybrid model which Ψ-ES-realizes
FCOM against static adversaries. So to complete the proof we need to specify how to Ψ-ES-realize FENC
against static adversaries. For this we use the same protocol as in [3], namely a CCA2-secure encryption
with the receiving party generating the public-key/secret-key pair afresh for each session. But since we are
working in the Ψ-ES model, we need the CCA2-secure encryption scheme to remain secure even when the
adversary has access to Ψ. This can be accomplished based on assumption A3, by using any CCA2-secure
encryption based on trapdoor permutations, for instance the one from [25]. 
6 One-to-Many Commit-and-Prove
Inthis sectionweoutlinethe proofofLemma1, whichcompletesthe proofofour maintheorem-Theorem3.
As in [7], we use two other functionalities, namely Zero-Knowledge (FZK) and Authenticated Broadcast
(FBC).
Functionality FZK
FZK proceeds as follows, running with a prover P, a veriﬁer V and an adversary SΨ, and parameterized with
a relation R:
• Upon receiving (PROVE,x,w) from P, do: if (x,w) ∈ R, then send (PROVEN,x) to V and SΨ and
halt. Otherwise, halt.
Figure 6: FZK functionality
Ψ-ES Zero Knowledge Canetti and Fischlin [4] show how to UC-securely realize FZK in the FCOM-hybrid
model, in an information-theoretic sense: that is, without any computational assumptions, or restrictions
on the class of adversaries. It is easy to show that the same protocol Ψ-ES-realizes FZK against static
21adversaries, in the FCOM-hybrid model. Since we have already shown how to Ψ-ES-realize FCOM against
static adversaries (Theorem 4), from the composition theorem, Theorem 2, it follows that there is a protocol
which Ψ-ES-realizes FZK against static adversaries.
Functionality FBC
FBC proceeds as follows, running with parties P1,...,Pn and an adversary SΨ:
• Upon receiving a message (P,x) from Pi, where P is a set of parties, send (Pi,P,x) to all parties in
P and to SΨ, and halt.
Figure 7: The ideal broadcast functionality
Authenticated Broadcast The functionality FBC ensures that all the parties to which a message is ad-
dressed receive the same message (if they do receive the message). Following [7], we use the protocol from
[12]. The protocol in [12] securely realizes FBC in an information-theoretic manner: it does not require any
computational restrictions on the class of adversaries. Thus, in particular, this protocol Ψ-ES-realizes FBC
against static adversaries.
Functionality F1:M
CP
The parties are a sender C and a set of possible receivers P1,...,Pn, with an adversary SΨ. The functionality
is parameterized by a relation R. The security parameter is k.
COMMIT PHASE
• Upon receiving a message (COMMIT,P,w) from C where P is a set of parties and w ∈ {0,1}k,
append the value w to the list w, record P, and send the message (RECEIPT,C,P) to all parties P ∈ P
and to SΨ. (Initially, the list w is empty). But, if a COMMIT message has already been received with a
different set of parties P0 6= P ignore this message.
PROVE PHASE
• Upon receiving a message (PROVE,x) from C, where x ∈ {0,1}poly(k), compute R(x,w). If
R(x,w) = 1, then send the message (PROVEN,x) to all parties Pi ∈ P and to SΨ. Otherwise,
ignore the message.
Figure 8: The One-to-many commit-and-prove functionality
The proof of Lemma 1 easily follows from the following lemma and the observations above, using the
composition theorem.
Lemma 10 There is a protocol which Ψ-ES-realizes F1:M
CP against static adversaries in the (FBC,FZK)-
hybrid model (under Assumption A3).
PROOF (SKETCH).
A protocol (in the (FBC,FZK)-hybrid model) is shown in Figure 9.
To commit to a value w, the sender C computes a commitment c to w under a perfectly binding com-
mitment C obtained from the trapdoor-permutation of Assumption A3 (which remains hiding even to adver-
saries with sampling access to D
µ
r for all µ and r). Then it broadcasts c and proves to each party separately,
22Protocol OM-CP
The parties are a sender C and a set of possible receivers P1,...,Pn, with an adversary SΨ. The protocol is
parameterized by a relation R. The security parameter is k.
COMMIT PHASE
1. On input (COMMIT,P,w), the sender C computes c = C(w;r) using a randomly chosen r. It adds r
to a list r (initially empty).
2. C broadcasts the message (P,c) by sending it to FBC.
3. For each Pj ∈ P, party C sends the message (PROVE,c,(w,r)) to a copy of FZK invoked with Pj as
the veriﬁer, and parametrized by the relation R0 = {(c,(w,r)) | c = C(w;r)}.
4. On receiving (C,P,c) from FBC and (PROVEN,c) from FZK, (after verifying that both values of c are
the same) each Pj ∈ P broadcasts the message ACCEPTABLE.
5. On receiving the message ACCEPTABLE from all parties in P, party Pj adds c to a list c (initially c is
empty; C also maintains this list).
PROVE PHASE
1. On input (PROVE,x), the C broadcasts the message (P,x) by sending it to FBC.
2. For each Pj ∈ P, party C sends the message (PROVE,(x,c),(w,r)) to a copy of FZK invoked
with Pj as the veriﬁer and parametrized by the relation R00 = {((x,c),(w,r)) | R(x,w)
V
cj =
C(wj;rj) for all j}
3. On receiving (P,x) from FBC and (PROVEN,(x,c)) from FZK, (after verifying that both x are the
same, and c and P match the locally stored values) each Pj ∈ P broadcasts the message TRUE(x).
4. On receiving the message TRUE(x) from all parties in P, party Pj accepts x.
Figure 9: A protocol which Ψ-ES-realizes F1:M
CP against static adversaries in the (FBC,FZK)-hybrid model
using the FZK functionality, that c is indeed a valid commitment. Each party on receiving this proof broad-
casts this fact. If all parties accept the respective proofs and announce it, they all proceed to accept the
commitment by adding c to a list c. Later, to prove R(x,w), where x is an input and w is the list of all
commitments made so far, the C proofs the statement (formulated in terms of x and c) to each party sepa-
rately using the FZK functionality. As before, on accepting the proof, each party broadcasts this fact. Finally
they all accept the proof if all parties complete this broadcast step. It easily follows from the security of the
commitment scheme C that this protocol Ψ-ES-realizes F1:M
CP against static adversaries. 
7 A CRS implementation of H and Ψ
We show how to use the common reference string (CRS) model to implement a hash function H such
that assumptions we need do hold, and in the IDEAL world, the simulator S can implement the Imaginary
Angel Ψ by itself. Thus the entire construction we have given here can be used to obtain an alternate
implementation of the commitment functionality FCOM in the standard UC paradigm (i.e., no Imaginary
Angels to deﬁne the IDEAL world) in the CRS model. Our construction uses ideas from [8] and [7].
23The CRS We assume a secure digital signature scheme [27]. Generate a pair of signing and verifying keys
(SK,V K). The CRS consists of the veriﬁcation key V K. The algorithms of signing and verifying be sign
and verify respectively.
The hash function H Recall that H takes four inputs: (µ,r,x,b). We deﬁne H step by step:
• Let G([n],E) be the graph describing an instance of the HAMILTONICITY problem, obtained by
reducing the statement (∃σ : verify(V K,µ,σ) = 1) (where the inputs to verify are the key, the
message and the signature in that order). That is, a Hamiltonian cycle in G can be converted to a
signature σ of µ veriﬁable under V K, and vice-versa.
• Let PRG be a pseudorandom generator. Following [19], let Cr be a bit commitment scheme deﬁned
as follows Cr(0) = PRG(s) and Cr(1) = PRG(s) ⊕ r, for a random seed s to the PRG. Note
that if PRG’s output is much longer than its input (say PRG : {0,1}k1/4 → {0,1}k1) then for all
but negligible fraction of choices of r, Cr is a perfectly binding scheme (because the set {r : r =
PRG(s1) ⊕ PRG(s2)} has at most 2k1/2 elements).
• Consider a second (equivocable) commitment scheme Qr as follows. Pick a random permutation
of the vertices of G, π. Let Aπ(G) be the adjacency matrix of π(G), the graph G with vertices
permuted according to π. Then Qr(0) = M(0) where M(0) is a commitment to Aπ(G): M
(0)
ij =
Cr(Aπ(G)ij;sij). To compute Qr(1), pick a random cycle on n vertices. Deﬁne matrix M(1) as
follows: if an edge (i,j) is in the cycle M
(1)
ij = Cr(1), else set M
(1)
ij to be random string from
{0,1}k1. Then Qr(1) = M(1). Let k2 = poly(k1) be an upperbound on the total number of random
bits it takes to compute M(b).
• Let H(µ,r,x,b) = M(b) where x is used as the random tape in computing M(b).
Implementing the Imaginary Angel Ψ In the CRS model, the simulator can choose (SK,V K) and set
V K as the CRS. The Imaginary Angel can be implemented using the secret key SK. On input (µ,r), Ψ
checks if µ ∈ X, the set of corrupted IDs (which the simulator can keep track of). If not it just outputs ⊥.
If µ is corrupted Ψ proceeds as follows: use SK to produce a signature σ = sign(SK,µ). Use σ to ﬁnd
a Hamiltonian cycle in G. It computes z = Qr(0) using a random tape x. Now it goes on to construct a
random tape y: consider the cycle obtained by applying π (used in computing Qr(0)) to the Hamiltonian
cycle in G. Pretend that this cycle was directly chosen as a random cycle over [n]- i.e., add it to the tape y.
For (i,j) not part of this cycle, pretend that zij was chosen directly as a random string from {0,1}k1, and
add them to the tape y. For (i,j) in the cycle, retain the part of x corresponding to the randomness sij used
in computing zij = Cr(1;sij). Output (x,y,z).
Now we argue that H and Ψ satisfy assumptions A1, A2 and A3. Distribution D
µ
r is deﬁned as the
output distribution of Ψ(µ,r) conditioned on µ ∈ X.
A1 (x,z) in the output of Ψ(µ,r) is indeed identical to {(x,z)|x ← {0,1}k2,z = H(µ,r,x,0)}. The
difference between (y,z) and {(y,z)|y ← {0,1}k2,z = H(µ,r,y,1)} is that the entries zij for (i,j)
not in the cycle speciﬁed in y are not random, but rather the output of PRG on random inputs, possibly
xor-ed with the string r. Indistinguishability assumed in A1 follows from the security of PRG.
A2 Sampling access to D
µ0
r is equivalent to oracle access to σ = sign(SK,µ0) (on each query, a fresh
signature is given). Also, ﬁnding a collision is equivalent to ﬁnding σ assuming that the commitment
24scheme Cr is perfectly binding, which is the case for all but a negligible fraction of r. But the security
of the signature scheme guarantees that (for a randomly generated (SK,V K)) it is infeasible for a
PPT circuit M to produce a valid signature sign(SK,µ) even if it has seen multiple signatures on
other messages µ0 6= µ. Thus (except with negligible probability over the generation of CRS), A2
holds.
A3 This follows from the standard assumption of trapdoor permutations, because security of the trapdoor
permutation is required to hold only when (f,f−1) is independent of (SK,V K).
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26A Sufﬁcient Assumptions
We sketch how the assumptions in Section 2.3 sufﬁce for all our constructions.
We assume a perfectly binding (non-interactive) commitment scheme C, whose hiding property holds
against PPT adversaries with access to the distributions D
µ
r for all µ ∈ I and r ∈ {0,1}k1. We use this
at two points: in the Ψ-ES commitment protocol COM, and the Ψ-ES many-to-one commitment-and-prove
protocol OM-CP. In both these places it is possible to replace this with the following (in the Ff ZK-hybrid
model): the sender picks a trapdoor permutation (f,f−1) ← T , and sends f to the receiver. Then it
uses the functionality Ff ZK to prove to the receiver that f was indeed generated by T (all we need is that
f be a permutation). The commitment is then done using the hard core bit of f as in [14]. Then from
Assumption A3 this is a hiding commitment scheme as well. It is easy to see that C can be replaced by
this scheme in both COM and OM-CP protocols. Thus we restrict ourselves to the assumptions given in
Section 2.3.
Since we employed the FENC-hybrid model (in the protocol BCOM), we also assume that there is a
protocolwhichΨ-ES-realizesFENC againststaticadversaries. Butagain, asnotedintheproofofCorollary5,
such a protocol indeed exists based on assumption A3.
B The Specialized Simulator UC Theorem with Imaginary Angels
In this section we extend the statement of the composition theorem, Theorem 2 to “specialized simulator”
UC [18], and prove the extended version. As noted in [18], a stronger notion of security is achieved in
the specialized simulator setting by allowing the output of the environment (in REALΓ, IDEALΓ or HYBΓ
executions) to be an arbitrarily long string. We shall also adopt this. (But it will be clear that the composition
theorem holds for even the weaker notion of security where the environment is restricted to outputting a
single bit.) Note that the composition theorem holds in particular with a “null Angel” for the Imaginary
Angel Γ.
Claim 1 The following are equivalent:
1. ∀AΓ ∈ C ∃s = s(k) ∀ZΓ ∃SΓ, |SΓ| ≤ s such that IDEALΓ
F,SΓ,ZΓ ≈ REALΓ
π,AΓ,ZΓ
2. ∃s = s(k) ∀ZΓ ∃SΓ, |SΓ| ≤ s such that IDEALΓ
F,SΓ,ZΓ ≈ REALΓ
π, ˜ AC,ZΓ
Here s = s(k) is restricted to polynomials, and so is |AΓ| for AΓ ∈ C.
If these (equivalent) conditions are satisﬁed we say π securely realizes the functionality Funder special-
ized simulator rUC with respect to the Imaginary Angel Γ against the class C of adversaries.
Proof: The proof mimics the proof in [3].10 Since ˜ AC ∈ C, the ﬁrst statement implies the second. To show
that the second statement implies the ﬁrst, assume that the second statement holds. Then given AΓ ∈ C and
Z0Γ we show how to construct a simulator S0Γ as required by the ﬁrst statement.
Consider an environment ZΓ which internally simulates Z0Γ and AΓ. Whenever AΓ tries to interact
with the parties (by trying to view the messages sent by the parties, by delivering a message to a party, or
by corrupting a party) ZΓ directs ˜ AC to do this and forwards to AΓ any information it gets by doing so. In
addition to this, AΓ may query Γ, but this can also be simulated by ZΓ as it also has access to Γ. Note that
10But we choose to present it as a direct proof instead of a proof by contradiction.
27the set of parties corrupted by ˜ AC is the same as the set that the simulated AΓ expects to be corrupted, so
the answers from Γ are perfectly simulated. Thus,
REALΓ
π,AΓ,Z0Γ = REALΓ
π, ˜ AC,ZΓ (1)
By assumption ∃SΓ such that
REALΓ
π, ˜ AC,ZΓ ≈ IDEALΓ
F,SΓ,ZΓ (2)
We build S0Γ exactly as in [3]: S0Γ internally simulates AΓ and SΓ, and (a) acts transparently between AΓ
(simulated internally) and Z0Γ, (b) when AΓ tries to interact with the parties, engages AΓ with SΓ (also
simulated internally) and (c) acts transparently between SΓ and the functionality F, and also between SΓ
and the (dummy) parties. In addition it acts transparently between AΓ and the Imaginary Angel Γ, as well
as between SΓ and Ψ. Then it is easy to see that
IDEALΓ
F,SΓ,ZΓ = IDEALΓ
F,S0Γ,Z0Γ (3)
From Equations (1)(2) and (3) we get REALΓ
π,AΓ,Z0Γ ≈ IDEALΓ
F,S0Γ,Z0Γ. Noting that |S0Γ| is essentially
|AΓ| + |SΓ| where |AΓ| and |SΓ| are polynomial in k completes the proof. 
The following is a restatement of the theorem in [3], but with two differences: ﬁrst, we replace the REAL
and HYBRID executions by REALΓ and HYBΓ executions respectively. Secondly, we change the order of the
quantiﬁers (from ∀A∃S∀Z to ∀A∀Z∃S) as mentioned above.
Theorem 6 Let C be a class of real-world adversaries and F be an ideal functionality. Let π be an n-party
protocol in the F-hybrid model and let ρ be an n-party protocol that Γ-ES-realizes F against adversaries
of class C under specialized-simulator UC. Then for any real-world adversary ∀AΓ ∈ C∃ a polynomial
h = h(k) such that ∀ZΓ∃ a hybrid-model adversary HΓ ∈ C such that we have:
REALΓ
πρ,AΓ,ZΓ ≈ HYB
Γ,F
π,HΓ,ZΓ
Further if ρ securely realizes F not under specialized-simulator UC, then HΓ does not depend on ZΓ.
Much of the difference in the proof is due to the extension to the specialized simulator setting. Note that
in the proof of Claim 1 we showed that for every AΓ ∈ C and Z0Γ, there exists ZΓ such that REALΓ
π, ˜ AC,ZΓ
and REALΓ
π,AΓ,Z0Γ are identical. So to prove Theorem 2, it sufﬁces to show that for any ZΓ there exists
HΓ ∈ C such that
REALΓ
πρ, ˜ AC,ZΓ ≈ HYB
Γ,F
π,HΓ,ZΓ
Proof: Given an environment ZΓ, we want to construct a hybrid-world HΓ and argue that it satisﬁes
REALΓ
πρ, ˜ AC,ZΓ ≈ HYB
Γ,F
π,HΓ,ZΓ
Suppose m is an upper bound on the number of invocations of the protocol ρ within π. First, for ` =
1,...,m, weconstructenvironmentsZΓ
` fortestingprotocolρ(asastand-aloneprotocol)andcorresponding
simulators SΓ
` (guaranteed to exist by the hypothesis that ρ securely realizes F). HΓ is constructed from
28Adversary HΓ
`
Given a security parameter k, adversary HΓ
` proceeds as follows, interacting with parties P1,...,Pn running
protocolπρ intheF(`+1)-hybridmodel(i.e., atmost`+1copiesofF)withanenvironmentZΓ andImaginary
Angel Γ.
Suppose m = m(k) is an upperbound on the number of session IDs for copies of ρ and F together. The `+1
copies of F, denoted by F(1),...,F(`+1), are associated with the ﬁrst ` + 1 session IDs. Internally, HΓ
` will
run the ` simulators SΓ
1 ,...,SΓ
` and m − ` copies of ˜ AC. Let X Γ
j denote SΓ
j for j ≤ ` and the j − `-th copy
of ˜ AC for j > `.
1. If activated with an instruction from ZΓ to report the new messages sent by the parties, proceed as
follows:
(a) Collect the messages sent by the parties P1,...,Pn
(b) Activate each (running) X Γ
j with an instruction to report new messages sent by the parties in the
copy of ρ with session ID j (for j ≤ ` the copy of ρ is simulated by SΓ
j ).
(c) Combine the messages gathered from the above two steps and report them back to ZΓ as the
messages sent by parties running πρ.
2. If activated with an instruction to deliver a π-message to some party Pi then deliver that message as
instructed. If the instruction is to deliver a message with one of the m session IDs of ρ, say the j-th
session ID, then forward that instruction to X Γ
j and activate it.
3. If activated with an instruction to corrupt a party Pi, proceed as follows:
(a) Corrupt the party Pi (if allowed by class C) and obtain Pi’s state regarding the execution of π.
(b) Activate each (running) X Γ
j with the same instruction, and collect the internal states of Pi re-
garding the copies of ρ as reported by the X Γ
j ’s (for j ≤ ` this is information simulated by
SΓ
j ).
(c) Combine the states obtained in the above two steps to obtain a (simulated) state of Pi with respect
to protocol πρ, and report it back to ZΓ.
4. If activated with an input from a copy F(j) of F for j ≤ `, or a ρ-message with session ID j > ` from
some party, forward that message to X Γ
j and activate it.
5. If X Γ
j tries to deliver a message to some party or to F(j) (only for j ≤ `), deliver the message to the
party or F(j) respectively. If X Γ
j (j ≤ `) tries to make a query to the Imaginary Angel Γ, make the
query and return the answer to X Γ
j . Note that by step 3(a) and 3(b), at any time the set of corrupted
parties (on which Γ’s answers may depend) is the same for all simulated X Γ
j (j ≤ `) and HΓ
` , so the
Imaginary Angel access of X Γ
j is perfectly simulated by HΓ
` .
Figure 10: The adversaries HΓ
` for πρ in the F(`+1)-hybrid model.
the m simulators SΓ
1 ,...,SΓ
m and HΓ will essentially be
Pm
`=1 |SΓ
` | ≤ ms, where s = s(k) is the bound on
the simulator size coming from the security of ρ. Our construction will be such that the following relations
29Environment ZΓ
`
Given a security parameter k and input z, environment ZΓ
` proceeds as follows, interacting with parties
P1,...,Pn running protocol ρ and with an adversary AΓ.
1. If activated for the ﬁrst time, initialize a variable s to hold the global state of the following system:
there are n parties P0
1,...,P0
n running protocol πρ in the F(`)-hybrid model, and adversary HΓ
`−1.
Initialize s so that ZΓ gets z as its input, and gets activated.
If not the ﬁrst activation, the update the variable s as follows:
(a) If Pi has output a new value y, then update the state of the simulated party P0
i by including a
message y received from F(`)
(b) If AΓ has a new output, forward it to HΓ
`−1 as output of X Γ
` (as deﬁned in Figure 10).
2. Simulate execution of the system starting in state s until one of the following events occurs in the
simulation:
(a) Party P0
i sends a message x to F(`). In this case, save the current state of simulation in s, and
activate Pi with input x.
(b) X Γ
` is activated with input v. In this case save the state in s and activate AΓ with input v.
(c) Environment ZΓ halts. In this case output whatever ZΓ outputs and halt.
Figure 11: The environments ZΓ
` for a single copy of ρ.
hold:
REALΓ
πρ, ˜ AC,ZΓ = REALΓ
ρ, ˜ AC,ZΓ
1
(4)
REALΓ
ρ, ˜ AC,ZΓ
`
≈ IDEALΓ
F,SΓ
` ,ZΓ
`
for ` = 1,...,m (5)
IDEALΓ
F,SΓ
` ,ZΓ
`
= REALΓ
ρ, ˜ AC,ZΓ
`+1
for ` = 1,...,m − 1 (6)
IDEALΓ
F,SΓ
m,ZΓ
m = HYB
Γ,F
π,HΓ,ZΓ (7)
Thus for all polynomials m = m(k), we will have REALΓ
πρ, ˜ AC,ZΓ ≈ HYB
Γ,F
π,HΓ,ZΓ as required. The rest
of the proof describes ZΓ
` and SΓ
` and argues why the above relations hold.
Equation (4) is established by setting up ZΓ
1 to internally simulate ZΓ, π and all but one invocation
of ρ by π. Given ZΓ
` , from the fact that ρ securely realizes F, SΓ
` is obtained as that simulator for which
Equation (5) holds. Given ZΓ
` and SΓ
` , ZΓ
`+1 is constructed so that Equation (6) will hold: for this ZΓ
`+1
will internally simulate the IDEALΓ system consisting of F, SΓ
` and ZΓ
` , but leaving out one invocation of
ρ that is simulated by ZΓ
` . Thus ZΓ
`+1 simulates one more copy of F and one less invocation of ρ than
ZΓ
` . By the time we get to ZΓ
m, it simulates m − 1 copies of F internally, along with SΓ
1 ,...,SΓ
m−1. Thus
IDEALΓ
F,SΓ
m,ZΓ
m consists of m copies of F and the m simulators SΓ
1 ,...,SΓ
m. Finally, for Equation (7) we set
up HΓ to simulate the IDEALΓ system involving F, SΓ
m and ZΓ
m, but exclude ZΓ and π which are simulated
by ZΓ
m.
It remains to fully specify the environments ZΓ
` and the adversary HΓ. It is convenient to describe ZΓ
`
in terms of simulating an adversary HΓ
` . We shall then let HΓ = HΓ
m. In Figure 10 and Figure 11, we
mimic the speciﬁcations of H and Zρ in [3], but with important differences to accommodate the different
environments SΓ
` instead of a single environment S.
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Figure 12: An illustration of ZΓ
` . The blue box in the middle is not part of ZΓ
` , but shows the adversary A
and the parties Pi it will interact with. The `−1 grey boxes to the left of the blue box contain the simulators
SΓ
j , j = 1,...,` − 1 (blue hexagon), the ideal functionalities F(j) (purple triangle) and the dummy parties
(small black circles). The grey boxes to the right contain an execution of the protocol ρ (the blue circles
indicate the program of the protocol run by the corresponding parties) with the dummy adversary ˜ AC (black
hexagon). The environment ZΓ is shown as a red blob at the bottom, along with the simulated parties P0
i
(red circles). The adversary HΓ
`−1 consists of the golden hexagon and the hexagons enclosed by the golden
curve. The straight lines show communication paths.
We deﬁne HΓ
0 to be ˜ AC. Figure 10 deﬁnes HΓ
` for ` ≥ 1. It is an adversary (simulator) which is designed
to interact with parties running πρ in the F(`+1)-hybrid model. In ` of the ` + 1 copies of F, it simulates
copies of the protocol ρ. For this HΓ
` runs SΓ
1 ,...,SΓ
` internally. In the copies of ρ (and the `+1-st copy of
F) HΓ
` lets the environment act on them directly by behaving like a dummy adversary.
ZΓ
` is deﬁned in Figure 11, and graphically illustrated in Figure 12. It is an environment (of polynomial
size, as we shall see) which can be used to test the security of the protocol ρ (with dummy adversary
31˜ AC). Thus specifying ZΓ
` also gives a SΓ
` satisfying Equation (5) via the security of ρ. ZΓ
` internally
simulates a system with n parties running πρ in the F(`)-hybrid model, ZΓ and HΓ
`−1 (which in turn uses
the simulators SΓ
1 ,...,SΓ
`−1 to simulate copies of ρ in ` − 1 copies of F). The protocol ρ to be tested is
engaged with this internally simulated system: the simulated parties interact with dummy parties running ρ
(provided externally) instead of the `-th copy of F. As can be veriﬁed from the descriptions in Figure 10
and Figure 11, this sequence of environments satisﬁes Equation (6).
Note that |HΓ
` | =
P`
j=1 |SΓ
j | + O(m) ≤ `s + O(m), which is polynomial in the security parameter.
Hence ZΓ
` is also of polynomial size, because the rest of the system simulated by ZΓ
` involves up to m
copies of F and ρ, πρ and ZΓ.11 Further note that if SΓ
i = SΓ independent of the environment ZΓ
` , then HΓ
is also independent of the environment ZΓ
To complete the proof, we observe that Equations (4) and (7) follow directly from the deﬁnition of ZΓ
1
(using HΓ
0 = ˜ AC) and HΓ = HΓ
m respectively.

B.1 Extension of the setting
Above, for simplicity we presented the above theorem and proof in a setting where the REALΓ setting has no
idealfunctionalitiespresent, andthe IDEALΓ settinghadF astheonlykindofidealfunctionalities. However,
indeed, the environments considered may include other functionalities within them (as functionalities are
merely polynomial time programs). Further, it is not difﬁcult to see that the theorem (as well as the proof)
extends to the case when the parties in the REALΓ and IDEALΓ settings have access to additional ideal
functionalities. This lets the protocols and functionalities to be deﬁned in terms of other functionalities.
C Proof of Theorem 4
PROOF (SKETCH). Given an adversary AΨ, we sketch how to construct the simulator SΨ such that for all
environments ZΨ, we have HYB
Ψ,Ff ZK
COM,AΨ,ZΨ ≈ IDEALΨ
FCOM,SΨ,ZΨ.
As is usual, SΨ internally simulates AΨ. If both the sender C and receiver R running the protocol COM
are corrupted, SΨ lets AΨ interact with them directly. We analyze the other three cases below.
Both C,R honest In the commit phase, until the last message the bit b is not used. So SΨ can follow the
protocol exactly, playing both C and R. However in the last step (Step 7), it sends out a random bit as b0.
In the reveal phase on receiving (REVEAL,b) from FCOM, SΨ simulates C sending b to R. Then it must
simulate the interaction between C Ff ZK and R with the statement ∃t : f(t) = rR ⊕ rC ∧ b0 = B(t) ⊕ b as
common input. Note that in this interaction all that AΨ sees is the message PROVEN from Ff ZK. So SΨ sends
that message to AΨ. Now the only difference between the executions HYB
Ψ,Ff ZK
COM,AΨ,ZΨ and IDEALΨ
FCOM,SΨ,ZΨ
is that B(f−1(rR⊕rC))⊕b may not be equal to b0 in the former (where as it is always the case in the latter).
But from the security of the hard core predicate (which by assumption on T holds even against adversaries
with access to the Imaginary Angel Ψ), it can be shown that the environment cannot distinguish between the
two executions.
11If we let the size of the simulator depend on the environment, say be equal to that of the environment, here we will run against
a problem as the size of Z
Γ
` will double as ` increases by 1, restricting us to m = O(logk) before the security guarantees fail.
32R honest, C corrupted Here we shall use the hiding property of the commitment scheme C and the sound-
ness of Ff ZK (Lemma 9). The idea is that SΨ can extract the bit being committed to by the corrupted sender
C. Consider the simulator SΨ which plays the part of the receiver and Ff ZK, and talks to C (corrupted by
AΨ). SΨ starts off following the programs of Ff ZK and the honest receiver. But after receiving rC, instead
of sending rR, the value to which c is a commitment, SΨ picks a random string u ← {0,1}k and sends
˜ rR = f(u) ⊕ rC. Then it simulates an interaction with Ff ZK, with the statement (∃r0 : c = C(˜ rR;r0)) as
common input: it simply sends the message PROVEN to C acting as Ff ZK. When C sends back b0, SΨ
calculates b∗ = b0 ⊕ B(u) (this is the extracted commitment). SΨ then sends b∗ to FCOM to commit to
R. Later, if C sends b as reveal, then SΨ plays the part of Ff ZK and interacts with C as it tries to prove
that (∃t : f(t) = ˜ rR ⊕ rC ∧ b0 = B(t) ⊕ b). If the simulated Ff ZK accepts the proof, then SΨ must make R
accept b too. For this SΨ sends REVEAL instruction to FCOM, which will send (REVEAL,b∗) to R.
Note that R is not corrupted and the soundness condition of Ff ZK (Lemma 9) holds. Hence if the protocol
continues beyond Step 3, except with negligible probability, f is indeed a permutation. This has two con-
sequences: ﬁrstly in the simulation, the sender can reveal only to the bit extracted by the simulator (using
the soundness of Ff ZK again). Secondly, ˜ rR is uniformly randomly distributed, independent of c. Then it can
be shown that distinguishing between the executions IDEALΨ
FCOM,SΨ,ZΨ and HYB
Ψ,Ff ZK
COM,AΨ,ZΨ enables one to
distinguish between the following experiments: in one experiment it is given (c,rR) where rR is a random
string and c a random commitment to rR, and in the other it gets (c, ˜ rR) where c is as before, but ˜ rR is
an independently and uniformly chosen random string. From the hiding property of C (assumed to hold
against PPT circuits with access to the Imaginary Angel Ψ (with any arbitrary set of parties corrupted)) a
distinguisher will have negligible advantage in distinguishing between these two experiment. It follows that
IDEALΨ
F0,SΨ,ZΨ ≈ HYB
Ψ,Ff ZK
COM,AΨ,ZΨ.
To show IDEALΨ
FCOM,SΨ,ZΨ ≈ HYB
Ψ,Ff ZK
COM,AΨ,ZΨ we consider an intermediate situation, where FCOM is
replaced by a functionality F0 which behaves like FCOM, except that in the reveal stage it accepts a bit
b from the sender and sends (REVEAL,b) to the receiver, irrespective of what bit it received during the
commitment phase. (To be precise, SΨ is also slightly modiﬁed so that it sends (REVEAL,b) to F0 (rather
than just REVEAL)).
Note that R is not corrupted and the soundness condition of Ff ZK (Lemma 9) holds. Hence if the protocol
continues beyond Step 3, except with negligible probability, f is indeed a permutation. Conditioned on that,
the statement deﬁned in Step 2 of the Reveal Phase is true only if b = b∗. So if b 6= b∗ the probability that C
can make Ff ZK in Step 2 accept the proof is negligible . Thus IDEALΨ
FCOM,SΨ,ZΨ ≈ IDEALΨ
F0,SΨ,ZΨ.
Now, if ZΨ can distinguish between the two executions IDEALΨ
F0,SΨ,ZΨ and HYB
Ψ,Ff ZK
COM,AΨ,ZΨ, it can
distinguish between the following experiments: in one experiment it is given (c,rR) where rR is a random
string and c a random commitment to rR, and in the other it gets (c, ˜ rR) where c is as before, but ˜ rR
is an independently and uniformly chosen random string (here we use the fact that f is a permutation,
except with negligible probability, thanks to Lemma 9). From the hiding property of C (assumed to hold
against PPT circuits with access to the Imaginary Angel Ψ (with any arbitrary set of parties corrupted)) a
distinguisher will have negligible advantage in distinguishing between these two experiment. It follows that
IDEALΨ
F0,SΨ,ZΨ ≈ HYB
Ψ,Ff ZK
COM,AΨ,ZΨ.
C honest, R corrupted The simulator in this case is the same as that in the case when both C and R are
honest. The proof of indistinguishability is also almost the same, except now the receiver is corrupt, and so
M cannot choose rR. Suppose c∗ is the value of the ﬁrst message in the protocol such that conditioned on
c = c∗ the difference |(HYB
Ψ,Ff ZK
COM,AΨ,ZΨ|c = c∗) − (IDEALΨ
FCOM,SΨ,ZΨ|c = c∗)| is maximized. Now consider
33the machine Mc∗ which gets r∗ such that c∗ = C(r∗;r0) as a non-uniform advice. (If no such r∗ exists, then
the probability that the execution proceeds beyond Step 6 is negligible, and hence the difference between the
two executions is negligible.) Mc∗ takes (f,r,h) as input where f is randomly drawn from Tk, r ← {0,1}k
and h is either a random bit (Experiment 1) or h = B(f−1(r)) (Experiment 2). It tries to distinguish
between the two experiments as follows. Mc∗ starts the system at the point c∗ has been sent as the ﬁrst
message in the protocol. At Step 3 it sends the message PROVEN to R. At Step 4, it sends rC = r ⊕ r∗,
and at Step 7, b0 = h ⊕ b. Now, in Experiment 1 this is identical to the case of (IDEALΨ
FCOM,SΨ,ZΨ|c = c∗)
and in Experiment 2, identical to (HYB
Ψ,Ff ZK
COM,AΨ,ZΨ|c = c∗). Thus Mc∗ has a distinguishing probability
exactly equal to |(HYB
Ψ,Ff ZK
COM,AΨ,ZΨ|c = c∗) − (IDEALΨ
FCOM,SΨ,ZΨ|c = c∗)|. By the choice of c∗, this is at
least |HYB
Ψ,Ff ZK
COM,AΨ,ZΨ − IDEALΨ
FCOM,SΨ,ZΨ|. Thus if that difference is non-negligible we have a machine
M = Mc∗ which can violate the assumption on the trapdoor permutation family. Hence we conclude
|HYB
Ψ,Ff ZK
COM,AΨ,ZΨ − IDEALΨ
FCOM,SΨ,ZΨ| is negligible. 
D Appendix to Section 3
Functionality F`
OT
F`
OT parameterized by integers ` and m, and running with an oblivious transfer sender T, a receiver R and
an adversary SΨ, proceeds as follows.
1. Upon receiving a message (x1,...,x`) from T, where each xj ∈ {0,1}m, record the tuple
(x1,...,x`).
2. Upon receiving a number i ∈ {1,...,`} from R, send xi to R, notify SΨ, and halt. (If no message
from T was previously received, then send nothing to R.)
(a) The oblivious transfer functionality, F`
OT
Protocol SOT
SOT is parameterized by integers ` and m, and a security parameter k. The parties are an oblivious transfer
sender T and a receiver R.
1. Given input (x1,...,x`), party T draws (f,f−1) ← Tk and sends f to the receiver R.
2. Given input i, and having received f from T, receiver R chooses y1,...yi−1,r,yi+1,...,y` ←
{0,1}k, computes yi = f(r), and sends (sid,y1,...,y`) to T.
3. Having received (y1,...,y`) from R, the sender T sends (x1⊕B(f−1(y1)),...,x`⊕B(f−1(y`)))
to R, where B(·) is a hard-core predicate for f.
4. Output: Having received (b1,...,b`) from T, the receiver R outputs bi ⊕ B(r).
(b) The static, semi-honest Oblivious Transfer protocol
Figure 13: Oblivious Transfer- functionality FOT and protocol SOT [7]
34Comp(Π)
Let the session ID of the protocol be sid. Party Pi proceeds as follows (the code for all other parties is
analogous):
1. Initiation of F1:M
CP instances: On initiating a session of the protocol Comp(Π) for the ﬁrst time with
a set P of parties, party Pi instantiates copies of F1:M
CP as follows:
• For each Pj ∈ P, j 6= i, it instantiates a copy of F1:M
CP with session ID sidij, denoted by
F1:M
CP [sidij]. F1:M
CP [sidij] is parametrized by the identity relation (i.e., R = {(x,y) | x = y};
thus this copy of F1:M
CP functions as a regular commitment functionality).
• It instantiates another copy, F1:M
CP [sidi] parametrized by the relation R = 
((m,si,m),(xi,ri
i)) | m = Π(xi,ri
i ⊕ si,m)
	
where Π(x,r,m) stands for the message
produced by the protocol Π on input x, random tape r and history m.
2. Random tape generation: For every party Pj, the parties run the following procedure in order to
choose a random tape for Pj:
(a) Pi chooses r
j
i ← {0,1}k. and sends (COMMIT,P,r
j
i) to F1:M
CP [sidij].
(b) Pi receives (RECEIPT,Ph,P) from F1:M
CP [sidhi], for every other party Ph ∈ P. Pi also receives
(RECEIPT,Pj,P)fromF1:M
CP [sidj], wherePj isthe partyfor whomtherandom tapeis beingcho-
sen. Pi then uses F1:M
CP to decommit to its value r
j
i. That is, Pi sends (PROVE,r
j
i) to F1:M
CP [sidij]
(which is parametrized by the identity relation).
(c) Pi receives (PROVEN,r
j
h) messages for every h 6= j and deﬁnes the string sj =
L
h6=j r
j
k. (The
random tape for Pj is deﬁned by rj = r
j
j ⊕ sj.)
When choosing a random tape for Pi, the only difference for Pi is that it sends its random string ri
i to
F1:M
CP [sidi] and it does not decommit (as is understood from Pj’s behavior above).
3. Activation due to new input: When activated with input x, party Pi proceeds as follows.
(a) Input commitment: Pi sends (COMMIT,P,x) to F1:M
CP [sidi] and adds x to the list of inputs xi
(this list is initially empty and contains Pi’s inputs from all the previous activations of this copy
of Comp(Π)). (At this point all other parties Pj receive the message (RECEIPT,Pi,P) from
F1:M
CP [sidi]. Then Pi proceeds to the next step below.)
(b) Protocol computation: Let m be the series of Π-messages that were broadcast in all the activa-
tions of Π until now (m is initially empty). Pi runs the code of Π on its input list xi, messages m,
and random tape ri (as generated above). If Π instructs Pi to broadcast a message, Pi proceeds
to the next step (Step 3c).
(c) Outgoing message transmission: For each outgoing message m that Pi sends in Π, Pi sends
(PROVE,(m,si,m)) to F1:M
CP [sidi]. Recall that F1:M
CP [sidi] is parametrized by a relation which
checks if m is indeed the correct next message produced by Π on input sequence x and random
tape ri = si ⊕ ri
i on history m (note that x and ri
i have to be sent to F1:M
CP [sidi] in the commit-
phase).
4. Activation due to incoming message: Upon receiving a message (PROVEN,(m,sj,m)) from
F1:M
CP [sidj] party Pi ﬁrst veriﬁes that the following conditions hold:
• sj is the random string that is derived in the random tape generation for Pj above.
• m equals the series of Π-messages that were broadcast in all the activations until now. (Pi knows
these messages because all parties see all messages sent.)
If any of these conditions fail, then Pi ignores the messages. Otherwise, Pi appends m to m and
proceeds as in Steps 3b and 3c above.
5. Output: Whenever Π generates an output value, Comp(Π) generates the same output value.
Figure 14: The compiled protocol Comp(Π) [7]
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